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LAWYERS AND CLIENTS

Stephen Ellmann*
We sometimes assert that clients are entitled to be the
masters of their lawyers. Men and women in our society, we
hold, have the right to choose their own fates within the limits of the law and the circumstances of their lives. They are,
in other words, competent to run their own lives-competent in the sense that they are legally entitled to exercise this
authority and responsibility.
They remain competent, moreover, even in those circumstances where they need to hire a lawyer. The Code of
Professional Responsibility tells us that when choices will affect the merits of a case or substantially prejudice a client's
rights, "the authority to make decisions is exclusively that of
the client and ... such decisions are binding on his lawyer."I

Lawyers exist, the Code suggests, to vindicate the right of
"each member of our society ... to seek any lawful objective

through legally permissible means; and to present for adjudication any lawful claim, issue, or defense." 2
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. A.B.
1972, Harvard University;J.D. 1976, Harvard University. I want to thank the Bernard Kayden Fund for Faculty Research for financial support for this work. An
earlier version of this paper was presented at the UCLA-Warwick International
Clinical Conference in the Fall of 1986, and I am grateful for the comments of
many participants in that conference. Bruce Ackerman, Robert Amdur, Vivian
Berger, Richard Briffault, John C. Coffee, Jr., Robert Dinerstein, Nina Freedman,
Kent Greenawalt, James Liebman, Henry Monaghan, Jean Koh Peters, Harriet
Rabb, Nancy Rosenbloom, Jane Spinak, Peter Strauss, and Cass Sunstein, as well
as many other colleagues, students, and friends, provided me with helpful comments and criticism. I particularly appreciate David Binder's warm encouragement of this project.
1. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (as amended 1981)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE].

2. Id. EC 7-1 (footnotes omitted).
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted by the American Bar Association in 1983, contain similar, though somewhat narrower, endorsements of
client competency and control. Rule 1.2(a) declares that "[a] lawyer shall abide by
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For some clients, these statements of principle are probably also accurate depictions of reality. Clients who enjoy
economic leverage over their attorneys, clients whose own
expertise rivals their lawyers' knowledge, and even, perhaps,
clients who are simply so unusually aggressive as to command their lawyers' close attention, may well enjoy legal
services that are finely tuned to the clients' own definition of
their objectives. Indeed, the lawyers for such clients may be
criticized for their failure to influence their clients to act in
3
socially desired ways.
For many clients, however, the reality is likely to be very
different. Attorneys, after all, wield technical expertise, enjoy exclusive or privileged access both to other lawyers and
to officials of the state, and bring familiarity and detachment
to situations in which clients are often frightened, angry, and
uninitiated. Often social status and economic class will also
give lawyers a standing to which both lawyer and client may
feel deference is due. Even lawyers not eager to embrace
class privilege may accept traditions and habits of professional autonomy which restrict the spheres of client decisionmaking and active involvement. All of these factors
encourage lawyers to assume, and clients to cede, a major
role not only in the implementation of client choices but in
the making of the choices themselves. It is with attorneya client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation ... and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
The Rules do, however, allow the lawyer to "limit the objectives of the representation if the client consents after consultation." Id. Rule 1.2(c). In addition, the
comment to Rule 1.2 observes that "[a] clear distinction between objectives and
means sometimes cannot be drawn, and in many cases the client-lawyer relationship partakes of a joint undertaking."
The Model Rules thus seem to acknowledge that lawyers make decisions on a
range of issues, such as procedural questions, that will affect the merits and may
substantially prejudice a client's rights--decisions that EC 7-7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility could be read to place exclusively in the hands of clients.
Even if this change is more than rhetorical, however, the Model Rules plainly adhere to the principle that clients are able to choose the fundamental objectives of
their cases. As the comment to Rule 1.14 declares, "[t]he normal client-lawyer
relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and
assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters."
3. Such criticism of the corporate bar dates back at least to Brandeis. See
generally Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and ProfessionalAutonomy: Social Values and Client
Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 503-08 (1985).
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client relationships such as these that this Article is
4
concerned.
As the role of the lawyer expands, it becomes increasingly appropriate to describe lawyers as exercising "power"
over their clients. Certainly lawyers commonly possess at
least a modicum of power, if power is broadly defined-that
is, they have the ability, if only through the persuasive impact of their arguments, to make their clients more disposed
to act (or not act) in particular ways than they otherwise
would have been. 5 A lawyer wields this form of "power"
when she informs a client that the statute of limitations will
bar his lawsuit if it is not filed promptly, and thereby causes
the client to act more rapidly than he otherwise would have. 6
This example of power hardly seems troublesome, but the
extent and the nature of attorneys' power over clients become more problematic as lawyers' advantages over their clients in knowledge, assurance, and social standing sharpen.
Moreover, lawyers who take on such an authoritative
role in their relationships with their clients may not even be
doing a good job of helping the clients. 7 Armed with great
influence over their clients, yet constrained by significant
systemic and economic pressures-despite the image of professional autonomy-lawyers may never listen to their cli4. Thus, this Article is particularly concerned with individual clients, relatively unskilled in legal matters, and relatively disadvantaged in their dealings with
lawyers. While corporate clients, for example, may ordinarily be much more able
to guide their attorneys and so need less concern on this score, I suspect that even
rich and well-informed clients sometimes find themselves at least subtly steered
by their attorneys. To whatever extent that is the case, these clients as well are
part of the focus of this Article.
5. I take this definition of power from Michael D. Bayles, who writes that "X
has power over Y with respect to actions of type A if X has the power to do actions
of type B, and if he does so act Y is more disposed to do an action of type A."
Bayles, A Concept of Coercion, in NoMos XIV: COERCION 16, 27 (J. Pennock & J.
Chapman eds. 1972). This formulation does not specify the means by which lawyers produce these changes in their clients, nor does it straightforwardly indicate
the justifiability of any of these methods. The nature and propriety of the elements of attorneys' power are the focus of the remainder of this Article.
6. In this Article, feminine pronouns typically refer to lawyers, while masculine pronouns typically refer to clients. Needless to say, each set of pronouns
includes people of both sexes.
7. For critical assessments of the exercise of such dominance by lawyers over
their clients, see, e.g., Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 106 (1977); Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence
Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 LAw & Soc'Y REV. (No. 2) 15
(1967).
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ents well enough to understand their actual needs and
concerns. Grasping neither the true nature of their clients'
problems, nor the contours of the solutions that would best
meet their clients' wishes, lawyers may wield a power that
benefits no one so much as themselves.
This dreary picture has prompted a variety of proposals
meant to enhance the standing of clients in the attorney-client relationship.8 Perhaps the most thoroughgoing attempt
to reduce the power of lawyers, however, has been the elaboration of the elements of a "client-centered practice" by
David Binder and Susan Price.9 Broadly we can say that client-centered practice takes the principle of client decisionmaking seriously, and derives from this premise the prescription that a central responsibility of the lawyer is to enable the client to exercise his right to choose. To this end,
the lawyer must learn to ask questions and listen to their answers with great sensitivity, for only by doing so can the lawyer learn the relevant facts and help the client articulate his
own values, and thus set the stage for the client's ultimate
choices. The lawyer must learn to say, or rather to guide,
less-for the crucial decisions must be as far as possible the
product of the client's own will, rather than the result of the
overt instructions or veiled guidance of the attorney.
There is much to admire, and to learn from, in these
principles and in the methods of practice which they counsel. But these prescriptions by no means eliminate lawyers'
power over their clients. To explain this judgment, Part I of
this Article defines two of the most troubling forms of law8. Mark Spiegel, for example, has urged that client decisionmaking in legal
situations be protected by requiring lawyers to obtain the clients' "informed consent" to a wide range of decisions, many of them dealing with procedural rather
than solely substantive choices. Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979). Douglas Rosenthal also endorsed the principle of informed consent in proposing his
"participatory model," in which clients do not have "predominant ... control" in
the lawyer-client relationship, but do "participate actively in dealing with their
problems and share control and decision responsibility with the professional." D.
ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO's IN CHARGE? 2, 154 (1974). Other scholars, while maintaining that lawyers cannot avoid influencing their clients' decisions, have sought to sensitize lawyers to their potential effects on clients and to
offer attorneys ways to "provide guidance and direction without implicitly giving
orders." See G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS
FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY 1040 (1978).
9. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENTCENTERED APPROACH (1977).
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yers' power-coercion and manipulation-and argues that
lawyers' use of these forms of power over their clients requires justification, since such conduct breaches the principle of client competence. Then Part II looks closely at
methods of interviewing and counseling that are characteristic of client-centered lawyering, and finds that these techniques appear calculated to develop a seemingly intimate
relationship between attorney and client, in which the attorney affects the client by methods that are both psychologically potent and manipulative.
To say that such methods are used, however, is not to
say that their use is necessarily improper. Part III of this Article examines the range of potential defenses for the exercise of such power, and argues that manipulation of clients is
in fact frequently justified by the very standard of client decisionmaking that it appears to flout. Nonetheless Part III also
concludes that in important respects the particular guidelines developed by Binder and Price undercut clients' ability
to make their own decisions, and so it suggests, ultimately,
the contours of a practice that could be more fully faithful to
the principle of client decisionmaking.
I.

COERCION AND MANIPULATION IN LAWYER-CLIENT
RELATIONS

Before we look at the nature of client-centered practice,
we should clarify what we are looking for. We should distinguish, in particular, between forms of attorney behavior that
sharply undercut clients' authority and other forms of lawyerly influence that are innocuous or even benign. In almost
any conversation, after all, each participant seeks to have
various effects on the others. We may seek to change our
listeners' perceptions, beliefs, or actions, or to strengthen
their commitment to the attitudes or plans which they already have. Unless we wish to condemn the most ordinary
of interactions as morally tainted, therefore, we cannot take
the fact that the client's understanding or intentions evolve
in the course of dealing with the lawyer as a cause for concern. Indeed, we might take such results as reason for celebration-for they might reflect that the lawyer admirably
performed her task of providing the client with information
about the legal world, and thus promoted the client's autonomy by enabling him to make decisions without the burden
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of ignorance. But certain methods of affecting the client are
plainly not so benign.
A.

Coercion

One interaction of obvious concern is coercion. Suppose, for exanmple, that the lawyer announces that she will
withdraw from the representation if the client does not act as
she (the lawyer) wishes. Perhaps she makes this statement in
an effort to prevent the client from committing perjury; perhaps she issues it to dissuade the client from insisting that
the lawyer take action which she believes would be tactically
disastrous; perhaps she seeks to force the client to pay her
fee. In other words, the lawyer may be acting in order to
serve the public interest, or her client's own self-interest as
she understands it, or her self-interest. In each example, the
lawyer believes that the prospect of her withdrawing from
the case may induce the client to change his plans-and
surely this belief is often a reasonable one, for even a client
who could find and retain alternative counsel may find the
risk of losing his present lawyer intimidating.
Under certain circumstances, withdrawal for each of
these reasons is ethically permissible or even required.O
But is the lawyer's use of the prospect of her withdrawal
10. The client's intention to commit perjury might be grounds for either
mandatory or permissive withdrawal under the Code of Professional Responsibility. See MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 2-1 10(B)(2) (mandatory withdrawal when
lawyer "knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule"); id. DR 2-1 10(C)(1)(b) ([p]ermissive withdrawal when
client "[p]ersonally seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct"); id. DR 21 10(C)(l)(c) (permissive withdrawal when client "[i]nsists that the lawyer pursue a
course of conduct that is illegal or ...prohibited by the Disciplinary Rules"); id.
DR 2-1I10(C)(2) (permissive withdrawal when "continued employment is likely to
result in a violation of a Disciplinary Rule").
The client's insistence that the lawyer adopt a course of action which,
although not contrary to the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is contrary to the lawyer's judgment and advice, can be a basis for permissive
withdrawal under DR 2-110(C)(l)(e) (permissive withdrawal when client
"[i]nsists, in a matter not pending before a tribunal, that the lawyer engage in"
such conduct), and possibly also under DR 2-1 10(C)(l)(d) (permissive withdrawal
when client "[b]y other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to
carry out his employment effectively").
The client's deliberate disregard of an agreement or obligation to the lawyer
as to expenses or fees is made a basis for permissive withdrawal in DR 2110(C)(1)(f).
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct contain similar provisions. See
MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.16.
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nonetheless an attempt to "coerce" her client? Her conduct
might be described as an attempt to persuade or pressure or
intimidate her client; deciding whether it is also coercion requires, first, a definition of this morally loaded but elusive
term.
For our purposes, we may say that one person successfully coerces another when, in order to alter the other's
behavior, he threatens to bring about undesirable consequences for the other person, and the other person alters his
behavior accordingly, at least in part as a result of the
threat." Under this definition, the fact that the undesirable
consequences are deserved is irrelevant to the coercive status of the threat; thus it is coercive to threaten to imprison a
man in order to rob him and also coercive to threaten to
imprison him if he commits robbery.' 2 By the same token,
the fact that a lawyer may be authorized or even required to
withdraw in the face of certain conduct by the client does not
11.

This definition is largely an abbreviated restatement, in informal lan-

guage, of the precise elaboration of necessary conditions for coercion set out by
Robert Nozick.

Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD 440,

441-43 (S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes & M. White eds. 1969). Peter Westen has
developed a generally similar specification of the elements of coercion. Westen,
"Freedom"and "Coercion'": Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 559-69.
Westen notes that he disagrees with Nozick's requirement that threats be successful in order to be called "coercion." Id. at 559 n.70. This issue need not be pursued here, and the definition given in the text simply refers to "successful
coercion."
This definition focuses on coercion by threats. It might be argued that coercion should be defined much more broadly, to include any action that tends to
prevent another from acting as he chooses. According to this definition, locking
the front door of a house, which tends to prevent those without keys from entering without the householder's consent, could be said to coerce them into not entering except with such consent. See Held, Coercion and Coercive Offers, in NoMos
XIV: COERCION, supra note 5, at 49, 50-51 (offering a similar, though somewhat
narrower, definition). An attorney may be able to coerce a client in this sense (for
example, by refusing to accept collect calls an attorney may force the client to pay
for phone conversations), but the central concern of the discussion in the text will
be with coercion by threats.
12. By contrast, Kent Greenawalt in another context has defined coercion to
include "creating unfair conditions of choice," but not, it appears, "fair"-albeit
frightening-conditions. Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion and Freedom of Speech, 78
Nw. U.L. REV. 1081, 1096 (1983). If imprisonment of criminals is fair, then the
threat of such imprisonment could not be called coercive in this sense. Both because the threat of imprisonment seems commonly to be called coercion, see Westen, supra note 11, at 577, and because an account of coercion in terms of fairness
seems to partially collapse the issue of the justifiability of coercion into the definition of the term, I do not adopt Greenawalt's definition.

UCLA LA W REVIEW

724

[Vol. 34:717

mean that the lawyer's announcement of her intention to
withdraw is noncoercive.
It follows that the lawyer who announces her intention
of withdrawing, in a successful effort to change her client's
behavior by making clear that his failure to change will have
undesirable consequences, is engaging in coercion if her announcement constitutes a threat. Not every announcement
of undesirable consequences, however, is a threat.' 3 When
the lawyer tells her client that the statute of limitations is
about to expire, she does not describe any harm that she
herself will cause; rather she informs the client, or "warns"
him, of the impending actions of others (here, of the legal
system).

14

It might be argued that in some cases even the lawyer's
announcement of action she herself will take should be considered a warning rather than a threat. For example, where
the lawyer would be legally obliged to withdraw if the client
did not change his planned behavior, the lawyer's decision
to inform the client of this fact-like the decision to inform
him of the running of the statute of limitations-does not
change the client's situation, but instead simply tells him of
the undesirable consequences that already await him. 15
Thus a speaker might be said to "threaten" only when the
undesirable consequences she announces are part of a voluntarily adopted plan by the speaker to induce action by her
listener.
13. The phrase "undesirable consequences" masks the troublesome question
of the standard of "undesirability." An offer of representation in return for the
payment of a fee can be recast as a threat not to provide representation unless a
fee is forthcoming. It may be possible to remedy this ambiguity by extending the
category of coercive pressures to include some enticing offers. See, e.g., Held,
supra note 11, at 54-57. Alternatively, coercion may be defined by specifying a
"baseline" for determining whether the consequences the speaker announces are
undesirable in light of his listener's expectations or entitlements, see, e.g., Westen,
supra note 11, at 569-89, although this solution, if it is feasible at all, may reintroduce considerations of fairness (entitlements) into the definition of coercion. I do
not address these problems here, but instead assume that the announcement of a
plan to withdraw from the case is indeed the statement of an "undesirable
consequence."
14. See Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 1096 (describing "warnings").
15. Nozick is "inclined" to call such statements warnings rather than threats.
Nozick, supra note 11, at 456.
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Even if we accept this rather restrictive definition of
threats,'

6

it is easy to imagine circumstances in which the

threatening character of the lawyer's announcement of her
intention to withdraw would be plain. Suppose that the lawyer believes the client is insisting on foolish tactics, but she
would in principle rather handle the case as the client wishes
than drop it altogether. Realizing that the client can be
frightened into abandoning these tactics, however, she decides to tell the client that she intends to withdraw if he does
not change his course. Here the lawyer is not merely predicting what will happen; she has altered what will happen
and now speaks in accordance with her plan.' 7 This, surely,
is a threat, and, if successful, is coercion.
Coercion abridges its victim's freedom to choose for
himself. 18 To the extent that coercion is used to press clients into abandoning preferences which they were legally
authorized to pursue, it also violates the principle of client
competency with which this Article began-that clients are
entitled to choose for themselves within the limits of the law
and their circumstances. 19 As a disregard of client competency it calls for justification; whether such justification exists remains to be seen. 20
16. Although Greenawalt might not consider the lawyer's announcement of
her obligation to withdraw coercive (since it might well be "fair"), he would classify it as a "warning threat," since this statement, although it describes consequences which have not been devised for the purpose of coercion nonetheless is
meant to induce action by the other person. Greenawalt, supra note 12, at
1100-01.
17. Greenawalt characterizes such conduct as a "manipulative threat."
Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 1097-99. Nozick also views comparable conduct as
a threat. See Nozick, supra note 11, at 454-55.
If the lawyer actually would not carry through on her threat if the client refused to budge from his own wishes, then her threat would be false, but it would
remain coercive. Id. at 442-43.

18. While this statement seems intuitively correct, it is not obvious just how
coercive threats abridge the freedom to choose, since the person who yields to
threats presumably does choose to comply with the demands being made on him
and could have chosen to endure the threatened sanction instead. For an exploration of such problems, see Nozick, supra note 11, at 458-65; Bayles, supra note 5,
at 24-29.
19. Indeed, coercion may abridge this principle of client competency even
when it is used to prevent clients from acting illegally. It may be questioned, after
all, whether a person who is unable to choose to act illegally is altogether free to
choose to act legally.
20. Part III of this Article will focus on the justifications for attorneys' manipulation of their clients, and will also briefly discuss the applicability of the ratio-
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For our purposes, however, threats and coercion are
not the central concern, for coercion is probably not the
most common breach of the principle of client competency.
The circumstances in which lawyers can threaten consequences as stark as withdrawal from the case are somewhat
circumscribed by the provisions of legal ethics that specify
the conditions under which such threats can lawfully be carried out. Perhaps more important, a lawyer who reaches the
point of threatening her client is likely to be a lawyer who
risks alienating or even losing the client-not outcomes
many lawyers regularly welcome-and who already is on
tense or hostile terms with the client. Surely lawyers who
seek to influence their clients also commonly hope to do so
without such fireworks, both to assure their successful influence and to preserve their own peace of mind. 2'
B. Manipulation and Vigilant Decisionmaking
To avoid such costly and distressing combat with their
clients, lawyers may resort to another problematic mode of
influence-manipulation. Like coercion, manipulation is not
simply defined. Nonetheless, some instances of manipulation spring readily to mind: lying, for example, or withholding of relevant information, or playing on emotional needs
of which the other person is unaware. These examples suggest that manipulation should be understood to have two
principal elements. First, manipulation is an effort by one
person to guide another's thoughts or actions in a direction
desired by the person guiding. Second, the manipulator
seeks this goal by means that undercut the other person's
ability to make a choice that is truly his own. These elements, however, need further articulation.
The first criterion-that the manipulator seeks to guide
another person's thoughts or actions-does not mean that
the manipulator necessarily seeks to harm the other person,
nales for manipulation to the defense of coercion. See infra note 103 and
accompanying text.
21. No doubt these generalizations are not always correct. There may well be
lawyers who thrive on pushing their clients around. There may also be clients
who accept or even welcome such treatment, for example because they believe
that a lawyer who is tough with her clients will be even tougher on the opposition.
Whatever the actual frequency of such lawyers and clients, however, such behavior by attorneys is surely not highly valued in client-centered lawyering, as the
description of characteristic elements of such lawyering below will make clear.

1987]

L4 WYERS AND CLIENTS

727

or to help himself. While manipulation for these purposes
may be particularly reprehensible, it seems clear that lawyers
may seek to mold their clients' thinking and actions in the
service of what they see as their clients' own interests or for
the sake of the interests of society. As we shall see, lawyers
may even manipulate their clients in an effort to help their
clients make decisions for themselves.
Plainly this concept of manipulation includes a wide
range of behavior. Some of this conduct will be frankly exploitative, while some will be intended to be benign. Some
will profoundly and permanently breach a client's right to
choose for himself, while some may in the long run vindicate
this right. Some, finally, will be unjustifiable, while some
may be proven to be essential to the proper practice of law.
Nonetheless I believe that, at least in the context of attorneyclient relations, it is proper to define manipulation broadly,
so as to insure that even well-intentioned, or seemingly
modest, interferences with client decisionmaking do not escape scrutiny. To exclude such conduct from the definition
of manipulation would ignore a wide range of intrusions on
clients' ability to choose for themselves in dealing with the
law.
In addition, neither the first nor the second criterion requires that the manipulator consciously intend to weaken
the other person's opportunity to choose for himself. Deliberate efforts to distort a client's decisionmaking may be particularly reprehensible. The desire to manipulate, however,
may be unconscious or obscured and yet exist. Moreover, a
lawyer who does not desire to manipulate may nonetheless
treat her clients in ways that seriously undercut the clients'
ability to make their own decisions. Indeed, even conduct
that normally is altogether nonmanipulative may inadvertently impair a particular client's capacity for reflection and
choice-though conduct that a lawyer reasonably should anticipate would have such effects is surely of greater concern.
But what conduct actually does undercut the clients'
ability to make their own choices? I suggest that we should
find such interference in actions that tend to weaken substantially the client's ability to make a decision in a fully
competent fashion. I also suggest that people make decisions most competently when three conditions are met: first,
they are aware that a decision is to be made and that they are
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entitled to make it; second, they know the choices open to
them and comprehend the extent and the likelihood of the
costs and benefits of the various alternatives; and, third, they
are acting with as full an understanding of their own values
and emotional needs as possible. 22 To interfere with any of
these prerequisites to clients' "vigilant" or "fully competent" decisionmaking concerning their legal options is manipulative. As a breach of the principle that clients are
entitled to choose for themselves, such manipulation requires justification.
Implicit in this definition of manipulation is the view
that a person's choices are most fully his own when he makes
them in the informed, careful, and self-aware manner that I
have called "competent." For many people, particularly
when they are making important decisions-and surely the
kinds of decisions for which lawyers are consulted are likely
to be important ones-this view may well be entirely correct.
These people may believe that competent decisionmaking is
a way to increase their control over their own lives. 23 They
may also believe that only decisions made in this careful
fashion are truly chosen and can truly express their own values and preferences. 24 They may maintain as well that only
careful and comprehensive decisionmaking is fully rational. 25 For these reasons, and perhaps others, such people
22. This standard is derived in part from the much more elaborate statement
of the procedural criteria for "vigilant information processing" offered by Irving
L. Janis and Leon Mann. I. JANIS & L. MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE AND COMMITMENT 11 (1977). My use of the
term "vigilant" derives from this work as well.
23. Daniel Wikler makes such an argument for education, which he says "generally provides information and [thus] generally increases our power, since it enhances the likelihood that our decisions will accomplish our ends." Wikler,
Persuasion and Coercionfor Health: Ethical Issues in Government Efforts to Change Lifestyles, in PATERNALISM 35, 52 (R. Sartorius ed. 1983).
24. Joel Feinberg writes that:
Chosen actions are those that are decided upon by deliberation, and
that is a process that requires time, information, a clear head, and
highly developed rational faculties .... Such acts ...

represent the

agent faithfully in some important way: they express his or her settled values and preferences. In the fullest sense, therefore, they are
actions for which the agent can take responsibility.
Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, in PATERNALISM, supra note 23, at 3, 7 (emphasis in
original).
25. Such decisionmaking might be seen as a defense, albeit an imperfect one,
against what Gerald Dworkin sums up as "our irrational propensities-deficien-
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will themselves seek to make their decisions as competently
as possible.
Not everyone, however, will necessarily share this positive view of "fully competent decisionmaking." We make
many decisions on impulse and on the spur of the moment;
many others we make in the heat of strong emotions without
a sober weighing of all the consequences. 2 6 Indeed, as
David Luban has persuasively demonstrated, we, or some of
us, may believe that making decisions in these spontaneous
or emotional ways is good. "[M]any people, perhaps even
most people, would find unbearable a life in which improvisation was no value at all ....

[I]t may well be part of the

good life to found some of our values on inspirations, even
27
though these may not be prudent."

If we accept that clients are competent-entitled-to
make decisions, then we should also accept that they are
competent to choose a decisionmaking method as well. To
reason otherwise, asserting that those who prefer other, less
"vigilant" decisionmaking methods are in fact so mentally
disordered that they are not entitled to make decisions because they are "incompetent," could justify the exercise of
control over substantial numbers of people. 28
cies in cognitive and emotional capacities and avoidable and unavoidable ignorance." Dworkin, Paternalism, in PATERNALISM, supra note 23, at 19, 29.
26. I do not mean to say, however, that only decisions that are made slowly
and coolly meet the standards of "fully competent decisionmaking" described in
the text. In an emergency, the gathering and assessment of information required
for decisionmaking that is as vigilant as possible in the circumstances can be done
very quickly indeed. See I. JANIS & L. MANN, supra note 22, at 65. Moreover, the
anxiety associated with important decisions can encourage careful consideration
and choice. Id. at 51. (Certain decisions, in addition, may only be made by people
under stress-for example, the decision whether to accept a plea bargain for a life
sentence instead of going to trial in a capital case.) But some decisions made rapidly or emotionally will not reflect such thorough evaluation and so will not, in
these terms, be "fully competent."
27. Luban, Paternalismand the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 454, 475.
28. The impact of such a judgment would be particularly sweeping if it were
extended to say that those people who accepted the desirability of vigilant decisionmaking as a matter of principle but failed to implement it were also incompetent. The argument for their incompetence may well be stronger than the
argument for the incompetence of those who disagree with the principle that such
decisionmaking is preferable, since it can be said of those who fail to make their
decisions by a method they themselves consider desirable that they are not acting
in accordance with their values. Cf id., at 473 (describing the "presumed consent" justification for paternalistic intervention designed to implement the values
of the person subjected to the intervention).
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Even if people have the right to choose other methods
of decisionmaking, it might be argued that "vigilant" decisionmaking produces objectively better results. If so, then
lawyers' interference with their clients' ability to decide in
this fashion would undermine the clients' chance of reaching
the decision that would best serve their own interests-and
perhaps the prerogative of not seeking what is in one's best
interests should be reserved to clients. It may indeed be
true that the more closely people approach the standards of
vigilant decisionmaking for any single decision, the more
likely it will be that the resulting decision will serve their interests best, though this is not a proposition that is easily
29
tested.
It is by no means clear, however, that all people will
closely approach full vigilance, nor is it clear that it would
always be wise for them to attempt to do so. Comprehensive
judgment in a complex situation may, after all, require the
simultaneous weighing of a very large range of factors. In
fact, "so many relevant variables may have to be taken into
account that they cannot all be kept in mind at the same
time. The number of crucially relevant categories usually far
exceeds 7 [plus or minus 2], the limits of man's capacity for
processing information in immediate memory .... "30
Moreover, even the effort to ascertain all of the relevant
considerations may be extremely time-consuming and difficult, so burdensome, in fact, that it may be essential that
29. Janis and Mann write that "[a]lthough systematic data are not yet available, it seems plausible to assume that decisions satisfying these seven 'ideal' procedural criteria [which they specify as the elements of vigilant decisionmaking]
have a better chance than others of attaining the decision maker's objectives and
of being adhered to in the long run." I. JANIS & L. MANN, supra note 22, at 11.
30. Id. at 22. There is also evidence that people are prone to systematic errors in evaluation of information, perhaps resulting from their use of simplifying-but in certain circumstances misleading'"heuristic principles which reduce
the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations." Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 Sci. 1124, 1124 (1974). Tversky and Kahneman have also suggested that people systematically weigh both probabilities of future events, and
the desirability or undesirability of those events, in ways different from those suggested by "expected utility" theory (which assesses outcomes based on objective
measures of their probability and desirability). Tversky & Kahneman, The Framing
of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 Sci. 453, 453-54 (1981). The more
problematic human processing of information is, the more it might be argued that
defining competent decisionmaking to include thorough and accurate processing
of information is implausible.
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most human decisions be made in ways that are not thorough and comprehensive. Rather than seeking the optimal
decision, people may wisely make most of their decisions by
methods such as "satisficing"-selecting a course of action
31
which, although not necessarily ideal, is "good enough."
Human beings, as "creatures of 'bounded or limited rationality,' " are

not inclined to collect information about all the complicated factors that might affect the outcome of [their]
choice, to estimate probabilities, or to work out preference orderings for many different alternatives. ... [They

are] content to rely on 'a drastically simplified model of
the buzzing, blooming confusion that constitutes the real
world.'32

But if manipulation is conduct that undercuts a client's
ability to make his own choices, and if it cannot always be
said either that decisions made in a "fully competent" manner are most truly the decisionmaker's own choices, or that
this method of decisionmaking is necessarily the best, why
should manipulation be defined as interference with this
form of choice? I suggest that ultimately the reason should
be found in an aspect of the role that lawyers are assigned to
play with their clients. The crucial aspect of that multifaceted role for these purposes is the lawyers' task of functioning as a limited, paternalistic check on decisionmaking
whose wisdom we somewhat hesitantly question. 33
That the role of the lawyer towards her client is somewhat paternalistic is evident from the profession's codes of
ethics. The Code of Professional Responsibility urges that:
A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made only after the client has been
informed of relevant considerations. A lawyer ought to
initiate34this decision-making process if the client does not
do s0.

31. I. JANIS & L.

32. Id.

MANN,

supra note 22, at 25.

at 26 (quoting H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF

PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION xxix (3d ed.
1976)).
33. David Luban has also suggested that lawyers play a paternalistic role. See
Luban, supra note 27, at 492-93. This discussion stimulated my thinking on this
issue, although the scope of lawyers' paternalism of which he would approve may
be considerably narrower than I suggest is appropriate.
34. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 7-8.
DECISIONMAKING
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Not only should the lawyer undertake to inform the client of
relevant considerations even without the client's asking for
the information, according to the Code, but the lawyer
should also often give the client advice about considerations
that derive from morality and "the fullness of the lawyer's
experience as well as his objective viewpoint." 3 5 The Model
Rules of Professional Conduct also authorize and guardedly
36
encourage extremely wide-ranging advice.
Whether or not the particular forms of intervention into
clients' decisionmaking that the professional codes endorse
are ideal, the principle that the lawyer has a role to play in
improving her clients' decisionmaking is appropriate. Our
desire not to override individuals' idiosyncratic values and
decisionmaking styles should not cause us to overlook the
substantial value placed by many people in our society on
making decisions in a careful and thought-out way. Nor
should our uncertainty about the ideal decisionmaking
method blind us to the high stakes in many legal decisions,
or to the extent to which sound choices in such contexts appear likely to result from the thorough and self-aware evaluation of accurate information that vigilant decisionmaking
entails.
Rather, I suggest that the arguments in favor of fully
competent, vigilant decisionmaking in legal choices are sufficiently strong to justify at least modest steps to encourage
the use of this method of decision. It remains to be seen
what sorts of steps are justifiable on this basis, although our
very uncertainty about the strength of the justifications for
vigilance suggests the need to limit the potency of any such
steps. But it is at least appropriate to require lawyers tojustify any conduct that moves clients away from vigilant decisionmaking rather than towards it. If we define
manipulation as an effort by one person to guide another's
thoughts or actions in a direction desired by the person
35. Id.
36. See MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 2.1 and comment. The comment
asserts, however, that "[i]n general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice until
asked by the client." Id. comment. While this observation might be taken as an
anti-paternalistic limitation on the lawyer's duty to intervene in the client's deci-

sionmaking, it may also be seen as a protective device meant to shield lawyers
from potentially troublesome obligations. Elsewhere, the Model Rules permit

lawyers to take the highly paternalistic step of withholding information, at least
temporarily, from their clients. See id. Rule 1.4 comment.
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guiding, by means that undercut the other person's ability to
make a vigilant decision,3 7 we will be able to insist on such

justification.
II.

THE POWER OF CLIENT-CENTERED LAWYERS

Armed with a clearer understanding of the forms of lawyers' interference with their clients' right to choose, we can
now ask whether client-centered lawyering avoids these
problems. In Legal Interviewing and Counseling: A Client-Centered Approach, David Binder and Susan Price have offered a
thoroughly elaborated guide to the practice of client-centered law. 38 Again, I want to emphasize that I believe this

book's suggestions for handling the difficult skills of interviewing and counseling have much to recommend them.
Before endorsing these suggestions, however, we should understand them, and so I want to look closely, as Binder and
Price do, at both interviewing and counseling, and to examine the character of the attorney-client relations that
Binder and Price advocate.
A.

Interviewing

Binder and Price start from a recognition that clients
have many reasons for being reluctant to speak frankly to
their lawyers. Clients may be embarrassed or ashamed
about relevant matter; they may fear that its revelation,
whether or not it is personally unpleasant, will be damaging
to their case, and they may have a range of other sources of
40
hesitation.3 9 To win the client's "full participation,"
Binder and Price urge the use of "facilitators." As we shall
see, these tools for effective interviewing are also potential
devices for manipulation.
1. Non-Judgmental Empathetic Understanding
The facilitator Binder and Price most emphasize is "the
effective use of empathetic understanding." 4 1 By "providing
37. This definition incorporates the concept of vigilant decisionmaking into
the definition originally offered at the beginning of Section IB. See supra p. 726.
38. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 9.
39. Id. at 10-14. Gary Bellow and Bea Moulton offer a similar analysis. See G.
BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 8, at 162-69.
40. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 9, at 14.
41. Id.

734

UCLA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 34:717

a client with the feeling that he/she has been heard, understood, and yet not judged"-in fact, by showing that despite
all that has been heard and understood the client still enjoys
the lawyer's "non-judgmental acceptance" 42 -the lawyer can
have "an enormously facilitating effect." 43 Indeed, "people
generally respond fully only in the presence of someone who
exhibits non-judgmental understanding.'"'4 4

Binder and Price believe that non-judgmental empathetic understanding is probably best conveyed through
the techniques of "active listening."45 Active listening "is
the process of picking up the client's message and sending it
back in a reflective statement which mirrors what the lawyer
has heard." 46 Thus the lawyer's response in the following
exchange is an example of "active listening":
Client:
I felt bummed out when I found out she was having an
affair with him. I thought our marriage meant something. I guess I was wrong.

Lawyer:
You felt
hurt and disappointedwhen she told you about
47
the affair.
By conveying back the essence of what the client has said,
the lawyer demonstrates that she has understood; by conveying only this rather than her own approval or condemnation
or explanation of what the client has told her, she also confirms that she has not judged. 48 Such a response, Binder
and Price conclude, is "completely empathetic." 49
In a section on "difficulties in mastering active listening," Binder and Price seek to dispel sources of "discomfort" with the technique of active listening.50 One of these
sources of discomfort is the feeling that "active listening is
being manipulative." Though Binder and Price concur that
"[t]he employment of active listening skills is indeed the use
of a technique to gain information," and defend it primarily
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

25.
20.
35.
20-23.
25 (emphases omitted).
26 (emphasis in original).
25, 31-32.
25.
32-36.
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on the ground of necessity, they do not directly agree or disagree with the charge of manipulativeness.
But this charge is well-founded, for the communication
of non-judgmental empathetic understanding encourages
the client to speak freely on the basis of a significantly incomplete, or even false, impression of the lawyer's attitudes.
The sources of this falsity lie both in the lawyer's decision to
convey this attitude of acceptance and in the client's perception of the attitude being conveyed.
For the lawyer, the attitude of non-judgmental empathetic acceptance is often likely to be wholly or partly a
pose. 51 It is hardly probable, after all, that lawyers regularly
accept their clients' actions and desires as entirely good or
just. It is not necessary to approve of a client in order to
recognize that his feelings and conduct are natural and
human, and thus to offer him a measure of acceptance-but
the projection of non-judgmental empathetic acceptance appears to censor out all attitudes which the lawyer has towards her client except this acceptance.
Moreover, for any given lawyer there are likely to be
some clients who have some features for which the lawyer
cannot muster acceptance. Binder and Price do not explicitly provide a solution for the lawyer faced with such a client,
but they seem to favor
a belief that lawyers can adequately employ active listening techniques even though they cannot truly empathize.
The belief is that, although true empathy is lacking, lawyers can proceed professionally by reflecting feelings in a
way that creates the impression of non-judgmental understanding. For lawyers with these beliefs, such action
is the only appropriate response of52a professional whose
job is to represent people in need.
The clients of such lawyers have a decision to make during their interview-namely whether to speak frankly or not.
If they do so because they believe they are accepted, then
they have been misled. Now it might be argued that clients
51. William Simon has made a very similar point in Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJusticeand ProfessionalEthics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 134 [hereinafter Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy], and has criticized other aspects of
"psychologist" lawyers' suppression of themselves in Simon, Homo Psychologicus:
Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1980) [hereinafter Simon,
Homo Psychologicus].
52. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 9, at 34.
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understand that their lawyers need information-and indeed
clients may have this knowledge. 53 Perhaps such clients also
understand that their lawyers are not necessarily expressing
genuine personal acceptance when they convey an attitude
of acceptance in the interview, but instead are simply engaged in skillful interviewing. Perhaps, then, these clients
perceive the possible falsity of active listening, and so are
neither deceived nor manipulated.
This argument is flawed, however, on at least three
counts. First, this defense is difficult to square with the
power Binder and Price attribute to the technique of active
listening. That power comes from the projection of the attitude of non-judgmental acceptance; if clients are really
aware that the attitude they see projected may not exist,
their apparent responsiveness to the technique requires explanation. 54 Second, this view ignores the rather subliminal
nature of the reassurance offered by active listening. As
Binder and Price put it, clients become more forthcoming
"[a]lmost without realizing it." 55 To resist these blandishments might call for considerable alertness and vigilance on
the part of the client.
Third, this position attributes a striking level of sophistication to clients. Clients may well understand that lawyers
have a job to do and are doing that job during their interviews, but that perception is far removed from an awareness
that the seemingly personal feelings projected by the lawyer
may be false. In fact, lay people may be at least slightly more
disposed to think of lawyers as helpful and understanding
53. Cf Mindes & Acock, Trickster, Hero, Helper: A Report on the Lawyer Image,
1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 177, 190 & n.45 (1982) (citing survey evidence that
most members of the public believe that lawyers genuinely try to understand what
their clients want).
54. William Simon has argued that in reality this technique is by no means as
effective as Binder and Price suggest, apparently in part on the ground that clients
will perceive its falsity. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 51, at 135. Simon urges the establishment of more intense and even contentious relations between attorneys and clients, and it may well be true that such relationships would
in some ways have even greater impact on clients than the ties that active listening
may generate. But I doubt that he is correct to question that active listening, a
close analogue of techniques evidently widespread in psychotherapeutic settings,
is also a strongly motivating force. See infra text accompanying notes 112-16 (discussing Simon's proposals for restructured advocate-client relationships); text accompanying notes 150-51 (discussing the psychotherapeutic use of techniques
resembling those advocated by Binder and Price).
55. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 9, at 15.
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than to see them as manipulative and tricky. 56 It seems unlikely that such people, experiencing a potent psychological
technique in the course of an interview with their lawyer, will
regularly see it for what it is.
Clients' misunderstanding may in fact go even deeper.
To see why we must understand more precisely what nonjudgmental empathetic acceptance is. As it happens, Binder
and Price do not give an altogether clear-cut definition, and
use somewhat different phrases at different times to describe
the stance that they believe lawyers should take. Thus at
57
one point they refer to "non-judgmental understanding,"
at another to "empathetic understanding," 58 and at yet another to the "empathetic ideal of 'non-judgmental
acceptance.' "59

Now these phrases do not, at first blush, have precisely
equivalent meanings. A lawyer displaying "non-judgmental
understanding" might want merely to show an intellectual
comprehension of the client's account of himself, and a willingness not to address any question of rights and wrongs.
"Empathetic understanding," by contrast, seems to call for a
much more intimate engagement with the client, an engagement so close that the lawyer might need to make clear to
the client that she was participating in or vicariously expe60
riencing the client's feelings and desires.
Finally, "acceptance," particularly empathetic acceptance, obviously might imply approval. To be sure, Binder
and Price are careful to identify statements such as "I don't
blame you" or "You certainly have a right to feel that way"
as judgmental and hence not empathetic. 6 ' But the guidelines they give for proper responses ultimately bring back a
flavor of approval.
Admittedly, no approval is explicit in the standard active listening response. As indicated earlier, active listening
56. See Mindes & Acock, supra note 53, at 191-92.
57. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 9, at 15.
58. Id. at 14.
59. Id. at 25.
60. Webster's defines empathy as "the capacity for participating in or a vicarious experiencing of another's feelings, volitions, or ideas ...." WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 742 (1981) (definition 2).
61. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 9, at 31. The statements quoted in the
text embody positive rather than negative judgments, but they express judgments
nonetheless.
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responses reflect back to the client what the lawyer has
heard. With a client who is not clearly articulating his own
feelings, Binder and Price take the view that the lawyer's
clear statement of what she has heard demonstrates her empathetic understanding. 62
With a client who has already supplied the clarity, however, the usual response reduces to repetitive "parroting."
Under these circumstances, Binder and Price say, "the lawyer can often empathize by directly expressing that the lawyer can understand the client's reaction," and they describe
the lawyer's response in the following exchange as "fully
empathetic":
Client:
I was so angry and frustrated when he again refused
to go through with the deal.
Lawyer:
I can understand6 how
angry and frustrated you'd feel
3
after he did it again.
Binder and Price explain that the client is describing a
situation so common that "the client will readily believe the
lawyer has been in the same or a similar situation." But if
the client believes that, and the lawyer then expresses her
understanding of the client's feelings, isn't the lawyer in effect expressing her agreement that the client's feelings were
natural and similar to what her own feelings would be in
similar circumstances? The lawyer is not labelling these
feelings as "right," of course, but surely in implying that
they are natural and that she would share them she has come
extremely close to saying they are appropriate as well. And
if this response is "fully empathetic," it would seem that the
unstated content of the more typical responses of active listening must be similar.
At the very least, it seems inevitable that some clients
will mistake the lawyer's evident desire to enter into their
world and to recognize the naturalness of their reactions for
something more than "non-judgmental understanding."
Such mistakes are all the more likely because much of the
62. Thus in the example given in the text supra accompanying note 47, Binder
and Price see the lawyer as responding to the client's vaguely stated feelings (for
instance, of being "bummed out") with a clear reflection of what she has heard
(that the client was "hurt" and "disappointed").
63. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 9, at 30.
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message of "non-judgmental understanding" is communicated only implicitly, "between the lines." Perhaps the resultant risk of misunderstanding could be removed if the
lawyer stated explicitly what attitude she intended to convey-but such a statement might undercut the subliminal encouragement the technique is meant to impart. In any case,
Binder and Price never suggest any such explicit statement.
Thus the client, unschooled in the subtleties of non-judgmental acceptance, receives no warning that he may be garnering less approval than meets his eye.
We may expect, then, that some clients will think that
what is meant to be "non-judgmental acceptance" is actually
affection and approval. We may expect, too, that a client
who encounters such unexpectedly, and unintentionally,
warm responses will sometimes respond in kind, with "reciprocal" affection and trust. Such feelings no doubt will frequently encourage him to be even more frank with his
lawyer, but his decision to open himself up will be a manipulated one. Once such a tangle of misunderstanding has developed, moreover, it may be hard to unravel; even if the
lawyer perceives the client's feelings and understands their
source, she may be reluctant to risk a "clarification" that
could destroy the very rapport she set out to nurture in the
first place.
In short, a central "facilitator" of the successful "clientcentered" interview has seriously manipulative elements.
Indeed, the borrowing of this quasi-therapeutic technique
for the sake of lawyering practice may well place in the hands
of lawyers-whose psychological expertise and sensitivity
are often otherwise quite modest-a powerful weapon for
creating a semblance of intimacy whose effect on the client
will be dramatic.
2.

The Other Facilitators of Clients' Full Participation

Most, if not all, of the other facilitators described by
Binder and Price also have manipulative elements. These
additional facilitators include the use of "expectations,"
"recognition," "altruistic appeals," and the promise of "extrinsic reward." The first three of these I will discuss only
briefly; the last raises a range of problems which will require
more attention.
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The manipulative potential of these facilitators is evident in the use lawyers can make of "expectations." Faced
with a client reluctant to communicate, Binder and Price
suggest that the lawyer can "verbally and non-verbally convey a strong expectation that the sought data should be revealed." 64 "Consciously or unconsciously," it appears,
clients may respond to these expectations, out of a need to
conform " 'to the group of peers and to the suggestion of
higher status persons in society.' "65 When a lawyer taps a
client's unconscious desire to please peers and superiors,
she is prompting the client to act on the basis of needs that
the client himself does not recognize are in play-a form of
manipulation.
Like the use of expectations, the offer of "recognition"
clearly provides ample opportunity for manipulation.
Binder and Price suggest that lawyers provide recognition
through "direct, sincere praise" of the client's cooperation
or help, 66 but even when the lawyer speaks sincerely she apparently is taking advantage of "a need for attention and
recognition, ' ' 67 a need which the client may not fully recognize in himself. Of course, the client who responds to the
lawyer's sincere attention and esteem may respond to insincere flattery as well.
Similarly, lawyers plainly can "employ altruistic appeals" 6 S-that is, they can urge people to believe that the
action the lawyer wishes them to take will serve some higher
value than self-interest-sincerely or insincerely. Even when
the appeal is sincere, its effect may derive from its boost to
the would-be altruist's self-esteem, an effect of which the
"altruist" may be quite oblivious.
It might appear that an appeal to "extrinsic reward"for example, to the need for full information so that the lawyer can best insure the client's victory in court-is the least
manipulative of the facilitators. In many cases, this appearance is not deceiving.
64. Id. at 16.
65. Id. at 15 (quoting R.
TACTICS 84 (1969)).
66. Id. at 17.
67. Id.at 16.
68. Id. at 17.

GORDEN, INTERVIEWING STRATEGY, TECHNIQUES AND

1987]

LA WYERS AND CLIENTS

But it is by no means always true that the client serves
his own interests best by "full participation" and frank communication. In a well-litigated case, truth may be the best
defense-but not all clients will face the discovery and crossexamination of litigation, and even some of those who do
might still serve their own goals best by perjury. Binder and
Price do not in the end assert that lawyers will always want to
learn the truth from their clients, 69 but the interviewing goal
of "full participation" which they establish at the beginning
of their book at least suggests a general presumption that
lawyers will indeed want the truth.
Like Binder and Price, I do not want to debate the question of how vigorously lawyers should press their clients for
the truth. Certainly the lawyer's desire to hear the truth
from the client has powerful foundations, in moral and perhaps legal duties and in pragmatic calculations. What I want
to explore, rather, is the extent to which the lawyer should
induce the client to speak frankly by offering the facilitator
of "extrinsic reward."
Truth may serve the client's interests in certain cases,
and perhaps it will even do so most of the time. But as long
as we grant the possibility that truth may not be pragmatically best, any statement by the lawyer that offers the client
"extrinsic reward" for speaking frankly but leaves out this
possibility of "extrinsic loss" is plainly, and manipulatively,
incomplete. At the same time, any statement by the lawyer
that suggests the client should try to gauge for himself the
strategic value of telling the truth or lying may present ethical problems for the lawyer, either as a matter of personal
conviction or conceivably under professional ethical guidelines. 70 Where an appeal to "extrinsic reward" seems neces69. Id. at 115 &n.l.
70. The Code of Professional Responsibility calls on lawyers to inform their
clients of "relevant considerations" affecting the clients' decisions. MODEL CODE,
supra note 1, EC 7-8. It also admonishes them, however, "never [to] encourage or
aid [a] client to commit criminal acts." Id. EC 7-5. Such conduct is also prohibited by DR 7-102(A)(7). See also DR 7-102(A)(6) (prohibiting a lawyer's "participat[ion] in the creation or preservation of evidence when he knows or it is
obvious that the evidence is false"). It is at least arguable that advising the client,
even tacitly, to assess whether perjury would best serve his interests approaches
the conduct disapproved by these provisions.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are, if anything, more cryptic.
Rule 1.2(d) declares that "[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist
a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer
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sary, therefore, the lawyer may be ethically unable to
provide her client with a nonmanipulative account of the actual possibilities of reward. 7 '
Moreover, the lawyer's duty not to present false evidence may also be in tension with her duty to assist her client to identify as fully as possible all those facts that promote
his cause, for the same facilitators that jog a client's memory
may also lead him to invention. Binder and Price offer the
following example of effective questioning of a client whose
initial account of his encounter with a car salesman provides
little information:
Lawyer:
I know it's difficult to remember, but it's really important to your case that you try. Go back in your mind's
eye. Try to picture yourself there with the salesman.
72
Think very carefully, what else did he say?

As they point out, this response by the lawyer offers empathy for the client's difficulty, the promise of extrinsic reward for his improving, and the force of expectations
(implied in the question, "what else did he say?") to elicit
more information from the client. 73 But the techniques that

may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a
client...." MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.2(d). The comment adds that "[a]
lawyer is required to give an honest opinion about the actual consequences that
appear likely to result from a client's conduct .... There is a critical distinction

between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity." These observations do not make crystal clear whether advice to a client
which explains, or even simply reveals, the possible utility of perjury should be
treated as proper or not.
71. I doubt that this dilemma can be avoided simply by the lawyer telling the
client that it is "usually" in his best interest to speak frankly to his lawyer. If the
lawyer hopes, by inserting the word "usually" into her promise of "extrinsic reward," simultaneously to make full disclosure and to maintain the impact of the
extrinsic reward, her statement may well be designed both to formally reveal and
to effectively obscure the possibility that the client's self-interest lies elsewhere. If
the lawyer really seeks to present this possibility to the client, on the other hand,
she might have to call it to his attention and explain why it is a possibility. But at
this point she may be approaching the ethical problems involved in, counseling
that shades into the encouragement of crime. See supra note 70.
In general, given the emotional and subtle character of most of the types of
facilitators at the lawyer's disposal, it seems likely that lawyers can manipulate
their clients' understanding and appreciation of a situation successfully even while
providing the clients with disclosures that may be formally sufficient to avoid the
charge that information has been concealed.
72. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 9, at 93.

73. Id. at 94-95.
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prompt a faulty memory and uncover accurate facts may also
lead the client to begin, even without any conscious intention to distort, to invent new "memories." As Monroe
Freedman has written in a related context, "[o]n the one
hand, we know that by telling the client that a particular fact
is important, and why it is important, we may induce the client to 'remember' the fact even if it did not occur. On the
other hand, important facts can truly be lost if we fail74to provide the client with every possible aid to memory."
Again, I don't want to debate the issue of where the line
should be drawn between helping the client to recall the relevant facts and prompting him to invent them. This line has
to be drawn, however, and wherever it is drawn the lawyer's
questions will then motivate, or not motivate, the client in
ways that the client presumably will not fully perceive. It is
difficult to imagine how the lawyer could offer the client a
choice on this matter, despite its integral importance to his
case, without either interfering with the process of motivating recall or raising questions about the encouragement of
perjury-or both. Yet if the lawyer says nothing and simply
embarks on a strategy of questioning, she will expose the
client to a range of pressures to remember and to invent (or
the opposite), in response to which he will make a range of
decisions or judgments about what he believes the facts to
have been. As with the issue of the strategic value of truth,
so with the issue of the questioning strategy for eliciting the
truth: the lawyer's position towards her client seems inescapably powerful and fraught with the potential for
manipulation.
At the heart of the effort to obtain full participation
from clients, therefore, are major choices about the vigor
and methods of seeking truth, choices which will affect the
client's fate but of which he may have, at best, only limited
awareness. Yet in the service of this somewhat unilaterallyor manipulatively-imposed goal of full participation, the
client-centered lawyer will employ a series of facilitators
designed or likely to play on clients' emotional needs and on
their misperceptions of the attorney's true attitudes and
opinions. The principal justification for these steps is, presumably, that they will in the end enable the lawyer to better
74. M.

FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM

68-69 (1975).
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serve the client's goals. Let us turn, therefore, to the interactions through which lawyer and client come to a joint understanding of what those goals actually are, and how they
should be realized: the counseling process.
B.

Counseling
The keystone of client-centered lawyering may be its insistence on client-centered decisionmaking. As Binder and
Price elaborate this principle, it calls on the lawyer to allow
and indeed to press the client to make the central decisions
about his case. The lawyer's role normally is not to make the
decisions, or even to urge a particular decision on the client,
but rather to help the client identify and assess the various
alternatives in light of the client's, and only the client's, concerns. Paradoxically, however, the counseling process
through which the lawyer pursues these objectives proves on
close examination to protect the principle of client choice in
part by impairing it through the use of somewhat manipulative means.
1. The Lawyer's Reluctance to Give Her Opinion
In at least one respect, this manipulation is an integral
part of the lawyering Binder and Price recommend. Out of a
belief that clients will make better decisions for themselves
than their lawyer will, 75 and out of a fear that clients will be
powerfully influenced by their lawyer's preferences, 76 Binder
and Price strongly urge the lawyer to "communicate neutrality and the desirability of the client making his or her own
decision."77

To this end, the lawyer is encouraged to take several
specific steps. First, although she of course is likely to arrive
at some opinion about the decision the client should makeindeed, "[t]he lawyer will often form a strong impression
about what is an appropriate course of action long before
the client does" 78-she apparently should conceal both what
her opinion is and even that she has an opinion at all.
The examination [of alternatives] must ... be conducted

in such a way that the client does not get a feeling that
75.
76.
77.
78.

D. BINDER & S.
Id. at 166.
Id.
Id. at 190-91.

PRICE,

supra note 9, at 147-53.
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despite what the lawyer says, the lawyer really does have
a preference about what alternative is chosen. ...[Otherwise], the final decision may be made not so much on the
of what the clibasis of the client's values as on the basis
79
ent surmises the lawyer thinks is best.

Second, the lawyer should firmly encourage the client to
feel that it is his role and responsibility to make the decision.
Indeed, as an initial matter the lawyer evidently should not
so much as mention the possibility that the client could ask
for, and receive, the lawyer's advice. The "Preparatory Explanation" which Binder and Price suggest should preface
the exploration of alternative decisions thus makes no men80
tion of any advice from the lawyer on the final decision.
Despite the lawyer's effort to keep the possibility of her
giving advice from even occurring to the client, some clients
may still choose to ask for this advice. Binder and Price recognize that in some situations the lawyer may have a "fairly
good sense of the client's value system" and may "know that
no matter what the lawyer says, the client will retain an independent decisionmaking capacity," and in those circumstances they agree that "it may be quite appropriate for the
lawyer to comply with the client's request." 8' At least with
such a client, the lawyer's giving advice is not manipulation
in the sense defined in this Article, since it should not undercut the client's ability to make a fully vigilant decision.
But Binder and Price believe that "[g]enerally . . .the

appropriate response to the client's request for the lawyer's
opinion should be an explanation of why the client should
decide." 8 2 When the lawyer makes this effort to "parry the
initial request," he should "watch the client's non-verbal behavior for indications that the client is quite dissatisfied with
the explanation." 8 3 Apparently so long as the client does
not sharply object, the lawyer should proceed with the nor84
mal counseling process.
The net result of these various tactics is potentially to
block the client from realizing that it is up to him whether or
not the lawyer gives advice-that is, to manipulate him by
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

166.
189.
186.
187.
198.
198-99.
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depriving him of an awareness that a decision about counseling procedure must be made and that more than one procedure is available. Even when clients perceive the choice
their lawyers have obscured, the behavior suggested by
Binder and Price will place the weight of the lawyer's authority and expertise behind the position that it is right for the
client to decide, and-the other side of the coin-wrong for
the client to seek or rely upon the lawyer's advice.
If, indeed, clients are as prone to deference to their attorneys as Binder and Price suggest, then clients may defer
to this view as well. At least, clients may no longer voice
their desire for advice, though their silence may mask feverish efforts to discern the lawyer's hidden opinions. Yet this
partial or total acceptance of the lawyer's position may well
not stem from a reasoned decision made after full discussion, for in fact the lawyer apparently seeks to stifle discussion of this issue. Instead, the client may be acting out of his
mistaken sense of duty or out of habits of obedience to those
with authority. The client thus may be acting on the basis of
motivations, perhaps unconscious ones, that the lawyer has
brought into play in an effort to prevent the client from
weighing the relevant considerations or pursuing his own inclination for advice more fully.
2.

The Framing of Alternatives and Consequences

Ironically, the same lawyer who determinedly seeks to
avoid stating her opinions will dramatically influence the client's decisionmaking in other, more interstitial ways. Binder
and Price recommend that during the counseling process
the attorney and her client should develop a list of the potential alternatives and then identify the advantages and disadvantages associated with each option. This process, as
Binder and Price recognize, offers countless opportunities
for the lawyer to influence the client's thinking, both in defining alternatives and identifying their consequences. Indeed, this process requires the lawyer to influence the client,
for the lawyer must at least simplify the dizzying array of
possibilities so that the client can address a clear set of
choices.
A client with a legal problem, after all, is likely to have
an extremely wide range of options. A tenant facing eviction, for example, may need money from welfare, or de-
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fenses in housing court, or psychotherapy for his difficulties
in managing his daily life, or political organizing to challenge his landlord.8 5 A lawyer who mentions some of these
options but not others-and we may doubt that lawyers
would routinely raise so wide a range of legal, political and
therapeutic possibilities-is inescapably and perhaps
manipulatively affecting the client's ultimate choice. Yet a
lawyer who seeks to mention all of the options is likely both
to fail in the attempt and to confuse or divert her client's
thinking in the process.
Similarly, each of these options may have a range of
possible consequences. If the lawyer in any manner calls attention to one set of consequences, or seems to weigh certain consequences more heavily than others, she will breach
the rigorous demand for attorney neutrality.8 6 Indeed, a
lawyer who does not consciously want to exploit this process
may still find it extremely hard to avoid doing so if, as no
doubt is common, she fairly quickly arrives at her own opinion about the best decision. Even when the lawyer acts precisely as she should to give the impression of neutrality, a
client who despite the admonitions he has received still
wants to know the lawyer's opinion may imagine that he perceives it in her conduct of this examination of consequences.
Yet the lawyer cannot avoid carrying out this examination, and cannot avoid some measure of responsibility for
guiding and simplifying it. As Binder and Price note,
"[o]bviously, there are innumerable gradations of result
which the lawyer might provide for the client. However, in
our experience, there can be such a thing as providing too
many possibilities. At some point, the possibilities are so
numerous they serve only to confuse." 8 7
Is the lawyer's omission of information in order to avoid
confusion a form of manipulation, since it means that the
client does not himself have all the relevant information? If
the effect of the omissions is not to obscure relevant aspects
of the situation but rather to clarify them, then we may say
that they do not undercut the client's ability to make a vigilant decision, and so are not manipulative. Simplification, in
85. This example is inspired by a somewhat similar case set out in G.
& B. MOULTON, supra note 8, at 1001-02.
86. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 9, at 172.
87. Id. at 161.
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short, need not be manipulation.88 But the lawyer's role in
the framing of the client's options provides ample room for
omissions that are less circumscribed in effects and less benign in purpose.
3.

The Exclusion of Moral and Political Concerns

In at least one respect, the role that Binder and Price
prescribe for lawyers in the decisionmaking process does
embody, or at least suggests, an aspect of the lawyer's values-her view of the sorts of issues that are likely to be of
concern to the client. This perspective can affect the options
she calls to the client's attention, and it can determine the
course of the discussion of the consequences of those options that are identified. Binder and Price emphasize that
each alternative can have both legal and nonlegal consequences, all of which must be taken into account. They believe that the lawyer should assist the client in identifying the
nonlegal consequences by asking him about them; 8 9 otherwise, presumably, consequences which the client would
identify if asked may not be given appropriate consideration
in the decisionmaking process.
Given the importance of the lawyer's asking, the lawyer's choice of topics is also important. As Binder and Price
define "nonlegal consequences," these "refer principally to
the economic, social, and psychological results that will arise
upon choosing a given course of action." 90 The tenor of the
discussion of these nonlegal consequences strongly suggests
that Binder and Price are focusing on the consequences to
the various self-interests of the client.
Yet much more is at stake in any case than one side's
gain or loss. The acts that serve a client's self-interest may
88. What if the lawyer withholds relevant information because she believes its
provision will so jar the client as to prevent him from soundly assessing the full
range of information that he needs to consider? Such conduct could be called
manipulative, since it deprives the client of information he would need if he were
capable of making a fully competent decision. But it could also be called
nonmanipulative, since for this client the omission will (the attorney believes) enable him to make a more competent decision than he otherwise would. I suggest
that this conduct should be considered manipulative, since it has blocked the client from making a fully competent decision. At the same time, this conduct may
well be justified, since it has rendered the client more competent than he otherwise would have been.
89. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 9,at 147.
90. Id. at 138.
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take unfair advantage of other people or cause them more
damage than they deserve to suffer. If the lawyer does not
also ask the client about moral or political consequences, she
may implicitly exclude these effects on others from the counseling process. Her silence may suggest to her client-by
now powerfully moved to trust her by the lawyer's careful
facilitation of communication in earlier stages of the relationship-that she believes such concerns are irrelevant.
Even if the client does not draw this inference, the sheer intellectual difficulty of assessing all the competing considerations affecting a legal choice may well obscure any issues
that have not been highlighted in the course of the identification of the costs and benefits of the possible decisions.
This exclusion cannot be justified on the ground that
the client himself is indifferent to any effects on others which
do not cause him social, economic or psychological loss.
Certainly some clients may possess such depths of indifference, but others may-if the question is raised-consider
these consequences well worth their attention. Some clients
may assume that such considerations are important, and
only overlook them under the lawyer's apparent lead. As a
result, a lawyer who fails at least to suggest the existence of
this dimension of the case may well have limited the issues
the client will understand to be appropriate, without the client's knowing, voluntary consent.
To be sure, a lawyer who seeks out the various economic, social and psychological consequences that the client
foresees will also encounter the client's moral and political
convictions. But the lawyer's apparent preoccupation with
the client's self-interest may not offer the client a framework
for discussing these issues. Thus Binder and Price offer,
with apparent approval, the following example of a lawyer's
discussion with her client concerning whether or not the client should accept a plea bargain in a criminal case, a bargain
which would require the client to stipulate, contrary to her
(the client's) asserted belief, that there was probable cause
for her arrest.
[Lawyer]:
What else can you think of that might be an advantage [of the plea]?
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[Client]:
Nothing really, but with that probable cause thing, I
would be admitting something I don't believe.
[Lawyer]:
That the police officer didn't realize he was wrong. I
can tell that would really bother you. Do you think it
would bother you for a long time?
[Client]:
I really don't know. What do you think?
[Lawyer]:
Mary, you know yourself best; I really can't predict
how you're going to feel. Only you can know that, and
how you feel is what's important because you're going to
have to live with the decision. Think about it. Do you
think it would bother you for a long time that you had
sort of admitted the officer was right when you don't feel
that way?
[Client]:
I think it would.
[Lawyer]:
Okay, then we have a disadvantage in going the
[plea] route ....9l
As one reading of this dialogue suggests, the lawyer who
translates the client's desire to act in a morally correct and
socially responsible way into a "psychological" need to
avoid guilt may be diverting the client from a consideration
of the moral or political standards governing the situation,
the issue with which he is (or perhaps should be) concerned,
to a concentration on his emotional needs. 9 2
4.

The Structuring of a Vigilant Decisionmaking Process
But this decisionmaking process can influence the client
whether or not the lawyer's actual or supposed opinions
creep in, and whether or not the lawyer's concentration on
the client's supposed self-interests sways the client away
from other issues. The process itself is likely to influence
the client, by guiding him towards a particular method of
decisionmaking.
A brief description of the full counseling process, which
Binder and Price set out in detail, 93 will illuminate its impact
on the client. The first step will often be a "Preparatory Ex91. Id. at 178-79.
92. William Simon has extensively criticized the apolitical character of what
he calls "psychologist" lawyering. See Simon, Homo Psychologicus, supra note 51.
93. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 9, at 135-210.
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planation," designed to inform the client that a decision
needs to be made, to describe "the process of identifying
alternatives and consequences and the roles which the lawyer and client will play in the process," and to confirm that
94
the client will make the final decision.
Then it is the lawyer's responsibility to lay out the alternatives and their most likely results, and to carry out, with
the client, a comprehensive exploration of the consequences
of each alternative. As these consequences are identified,
the lawyer classifies them as advantages or disadvantages,
and ultimately provides a "brief and compact summarization
of all the consequences which have been identified," for
without such a summary "most clients find it difficult to
reach a decision." 95 Usually the most effective form of summary is a written list of the consequences of the various alternatives, a list lawyer and client can prepare together.
Finally, the client makes his decision, perhaps after taking
the list home to consider it.
These guidelines are designed to assist and lead the client to carry out as fully as possible a form of the "fully competent" decisionmaking process that we have already
discussed.9 6 But the selection of a decisionmaking method
is itself a decision, and Binder and Price appear to assume
that the lawyer will normally do the choosing, and will explain rather than share her decision with the client. The client may perceive neither that a choice of method must be
made, nor that the choice may have a major impact on his
ultimate decisions.9 7 It seems fair to say, accordingly, that
the guidelines offered by Binder and Price call on lawyers to
manipulate their clients into making nonmanipulated
decisions.
Binder and Price themselves offer a portrayal of client
decisionmaking that may suggest its susceptibility to influence by process. Their description, which is consistent with
other characterizations of the limitations on human deci94. Id. at 188.
95. Id. at 183 (emphasis in original).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 22-37.
97. Certain types of "difficult clients," however, may ask or impel the lawyer
to adopt different strategies. For example, clients who insist on hearing the lawyer's opinion may be entitled to hear it. At the other extreme, clients who are
making an extremely bad decision may hear the lawyer's opinion without having
asked for it. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 9, at 192-2 10.
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sionmaking abilities, 9 8 maintains that clients "usually cannot
precisely identify for themselves what values they place on
various consequences." 99 When, after the laborious identification of alternatives and consequences, clients finally come
to make their choices, Binder and Price say that clients try to
take these various considerations into account through "an
intuitive weighing process ...[in which] there is no attempt
to quantify the various consequences, nor is there an effort
to systematically rank them. The pros and cons are lumped
together and weighed, and the risk factor is also somehow
included."oo
We may well expect that so hazy a judgment will be
readily affected by the intended and the inadvertent emphases that lawyers place on various factors in the course of the
vigilant decisionmaking that they guide. Moreover, it is at
least possible that for some clients this vigilant process will
lead them to decisions which they will feel are less truly their
own, or less desirable, than those they might have reached
by some other mental route. Perhaps some clients are so
puzzled by the elaboration of alternatives in the company of
a lawyer that they lose convictions to which they otherwise
would have adhered. Perhaps others find themselves forced
by the neutral listing of various consequences of a decision
to give them a weight they first intended to resist, and thus
to value "rationality" or even "deference to the lawyer" over
the passion which first led them to the lawyer's office. 1 0 '
It may well be, nonetheless, that the decisionmaking
process Binder and Price envisage will in the end serve most
clients' interests well, and that most clients will be well satisfied with the process in which they have participated. 0 2 Yet
this analysis demonstrates that the process of client-centered
counseling affects, and in important respects manipulates its
clients, both by denying them ready access to advice they
might desire, and by engaging them in a decisionmaking
process with the potential to shape their thinking subtly but
98. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
99. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 9, at 149.
100. Id. at 153.
101. For a discussion of other modes of decisionmaking, see supra text accompanying notes 26-32.
102. That clients may be pleased with the process does not mean that they have
made a nonmanipulated choice, or necessarily any focused choice at all, to engage
in that process.
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profoundly. As in the process of client-centered interviewing, so in counseling-even the attorney who most seeks to
represent her client's true desires still retains, and uses, manipulative power over her client.
III.

IN DEFENSE OF MANIPULATION

If Part II of this paper has shown that manipulation
plays a major role even in lawyering that seeks to be clientcentered, it has by no means shown that the presence of manipulation is a cause for condemnation. The use of manipulation to guide clients' decisions among legal options does,
however, call for justification, for it is a violation of the principle that clients are entitled to choose for themselves. This
part of the Article will examine whether such treatment of
103
clients can be justified.

As a preliminary matter, we will need to consider
whether the issue of justification is obviated by the sheer inevitability of manipulation, resulting either from the inherent nature of the attorney-client relationship or from
particular legal rules that may be thought to mandate manipulative conduct. If inevitability is not a sufficient defense, we
must then ask whether manipulation can be justified without
abandoning the principle of client choice itself. I will argue
103. The discussion to come focuses almost entirely on manipulation rather
than coercion. Since each of these forms of lawyer conduct is a violation of the
principle of client competency, the justifications for both types of behavior are

likely to be similar.
Nonetheless, these two intrusions on client decisionmaking are not identical,

and so the arguments for and against their use may not be identical either. Coercion has the virtue of being overt; as a result, the client subjected to coercion will
know what he needs to resist. Coercion probably also has the virtue of being
blunt rather than subtle, so that it can be used more readily to force compliance
than to obtain allegiance. Thus it may well be that coercion has less effect on its
victim's personal beliefs and values, and so, arguably, on his integrity as a person,
than does manipulation.
On the other hand, it may be easier to apply extremely sharp coercive pres-

sure than to achieve equally potent manipulation. Manipulation may be slower
and gentler than coercion. As a result, the behavioral changes manipulation usually achieves may be more modest, and its impact may be easier for clients to
resist, even if its use can be so subtle that clients are not aware that it is being
applied.
It is difficult to draw from such comparisons any clear rule that manipulation
or coercion is the preferable form of interference with client decisionmaking. In
any case, since both manipulation and coercion may be applied with widely varying intensities and for widely varying aims, any such absolute rule would not read-

ily do justice to the complex comparisons that are likely to be required.
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that in many cases a respect for client decisionmaking can be
the basis for client manipulation, but that lawyers who seek
to implement the principle of client decisionmaking fully
should offer their clients less intimacy, but more advice, than
Binder and Price suggest.
A.

Is Manipulation Inevitable?

Perhaps the very persistence of manipulation, even in
lawyering meant to protect clients' right to make their own
decisions, demonstrates that the question of justification is
superfluous, because such conduct is simply inherent in
lawyering. Perhaps, indeed, such conduct is simply inherent
in human interaction; given the complexity of human motivation, it may well be that almost all behavior has some edge
of manipulative intent. But we have been principally concerned here with actions by lawyers that tend to weaken substantially their clients' ability to make fully competent
decisions. To say that human behavior is imperfect by no
means demonstrates that conduct of this gravity-the conduct this Article defines as manipulation104-is unavoidable.
Perhaps, instead, manipulation follows automatically
from the development of complex legal institutions and the
division of the public into expert lawyers and lay clients. Clients presumably come to lawyers in large measure because
they are unable to make fully competent decisions on legal
matters without expert help. It might be argued, then, that
the various forms of guidance to clients in client-centered
practice are compelled by this basic fact of client
dependence.
We have indeed identified certain aspects of contemporary legal practice that seem to encourage manipulation. So
long as a lawyer is required not to present evidence she
knows to be false, for example, she cannot easily give
nonmanipulative advice to clients about the practical utility
of speaking frankly to their attorneys.' 0 5 Moreover,
whatever the lawyer's view of the proper resolution of the
tension between helping her client to recall and inducing
him to falsify, she may conclude, for ethical or practical reasons, that she cannot tell her client the details of the choices
104. See supra text accompanying notes 21-37.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 69-7 1.
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she makes in framing her questions, or offer to alter her style
to suit his view of the correct decision between assisting recall and stimulating invention. 106 Similarly, a lawyer who
seeks to give her client a comprehensible description of the
options he faces, and the various possible consequences of
these options as the lawyer sees them, must engage in a process of simplification or editing that can easily become
7
0
manipulation. 1

But it is important not to overstate the extent of manipulation which such dilemmas as these may require of attorneys. In each of the examplesjust given, after all, the lawyer
can choose to limit the manipulative conduct in which she
engages. The methods of achieving this goal will likely fall
short of wholly eradicating manipulation, and these methods
may have costs for the performance of other aspects of the
attorney's role-but such methods can be devised. The lawyer who cannot give nonmanipulative advice to clients about
the effects of speaking frankly may be entitled to tell the client that she is forbidden by law to address this topic fully, or
she may simply refrain from addressing it at all. The lawyer
who wishes to help her client to remember, but not to invent, may formulate at least a general description of her
questioning methods and principles and present this self-description to her client. The lawyer who wishes to avoid distorting her client's decisionmaking by omitting options or
consequences that concern him can spend time asking him
about the sorts of issues to which he wants attention paid.
Even the lawyer whose legal duties authorize or require
her to override her client's stated wishes may not need to
engage in manipulation. A lawyer representing a class, for
example, may agree to and advocate judicial approval of a
settlement despite objections from members of the class, but
in communicating with anxious or objecting class members
she may be able and willing to confront their concerns
frankly. Similarly, a lawyer whose client plans to commit
perjury has a duty to seek to dissuade her client from this
106. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
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intention, 0 8 but she too may choose to bring pressure to
bear openly rather than covertly. 0 9
To be sure, the possibility of limiting manipulation does
not mean that all manipulation can be avoided. But we
should be careful not to assume that because some manipulation may be inevitable, any given instance of manipulation
is likewise inescapable. Instead, we should ask whether particular aspects of lawyers' manipulation of their clients flow
inevitably from the intrinsic nature of the relationship, or instead represent conduct that could be altered-and so
should call for justification. I believe that this examination
will reveal that even very familiar aspects of lawyering are, as
we might expect, the product of individual and social
choice."10
Let us consider, for example, the lawyer's offer of nonjudgmental empathetic acceptance to her clients. Although
Binder and Price have paid special attention to the precise
modulation of the attorney's emotional tone, their endorsement of non-judgmental empathetic acceptance in a sense is
simply a refinement of some very familiar notions about the
prerequisites to effective work with clients: that the attorney
must gain her client's confidence, and that she should do so
by refraining from judging her client, and adopting instead
an attitude of zealous loyalty towards him.
.It is possible, however, to conceive of attorney-client relationships that do not rely on non-judgmental acceptance
or some close cousin of this attitude. Most mundanely, an
attorney might explicitly inform her client that she took no
position on whether what he wanted was good or bad, and
thus clarify the ambiguity otherwise engendered by the pro108. The Supreme Court observed last year that the effort to dissuade the client from committing perjury is "the attorney's first duty when confronted with a
proposal for perjurious testimony." Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
109. The lawyer may well find it necessary to warn the client that if he seeks to
pursue his plan she will seek to withdraw from the case. If this statement is true, it
need not be manipulative. In addition, since her effort to withdraw may be
mandatory in these circumstances, see MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 2-110 (B)(2);
MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.16(a)(l), this warning might not constitute a
threat and so would not be coercive. See supra text accompanying note 15.
110. Even such commonplace aspects of much legal practice as the holding of
client interviews in the lawyer's office are neither necessary-for lawyers could
make house calls-nor in fact universal. For a striking discussion of the range of
possible interview settings, including the client's home, see G. BELLOW & B.
MOULTON, supra note 8, at 173-76.
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cess of active listening. Still more bluntly, an attorney might
tell her client that she deeply disapproved of his stance in
the case, but that she would represent him vigorously anyway. Such an attorney might win her client's confidence in
part by treating him with such incisiveness and detachment
that the client would anticipate that her treatment of the opposition would be even more ferocious.'11
The terms of the lawyer-client relationship could also be
more fundamentally revised. William Simon, for example,
has offered a model for a more contentious relationship between client and advocate in his sketch of the contours of
"non-professional advocacy."'' 2 He explains that:
[t]he non-professional advocate presents himself to a
prospective client as someone with special talents and
knowledge, but also with personal ends to which he is
strongly committed. The client should expect someone
generally disposed to help him advance his ends, but also
prepared to oppose him when the ends of advocate and
client conflict ....
[T]he major principle of conduct [in
non-professional advocacy] is this: advocate and client
must each justify himself to the other."13
Simon suggests that from this struggle can come ties far
deeper than those which the display of non-judgmental empathetic acceptance can foster. "Non-professional advocacy," he writes, "must recognize that a relation of respect
and understanding between autonomous individuals can
rarely be an entirely accepting relation." '"1 4 He may well be
111. For a fictional, but quite plausible, illustration of attorney behavior somewhat along these lines, see R. TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER 29-69 (1958).
112. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 51, at 130-44. Simon himself
says that "[n]on-professional advocacy is difficult to describe with precision," id.
at 131, but its central feature is the rejection of a concept of a special "professional ethics" in favor of the view that "the problems of advocacy should be
treated as a matter of personal ethics." Id. (emphasis in original). Simon would
abandon the notion of the legal profession as a body of experts, responsible for
the zealous pursuit of any claims that citizens want pressed. Instead, nonprofessional advocates would act as advocates in order to satisfy their own political and
moral goals, and would interact with their clients not as agents to principals but as
allies or, in some cases, enemies.
113. Id. at 132-33.
114. Id. at 134-35. Robert Burt has offered a somewhat similar view of the
value of conflict between attorneys and clients. See Burt, Conflict and Trust Between
Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. LJ. 1015 (1981). Burt argues that mistrust between
attorneys and clients, at least in certain areas of law, is already endemic. He suggests that, paradoxically, rules requiring attorneys (under pain of being held liable
to injured third parties) to "pursue reasoned suspicion of clients in order to discover illegalities," id. at 1030, and then to disclose what they have learned (even
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right. In some cases, however, the result of this struggle between attorney and client is likely to be discord and divorce
rather than deepening respect. In some broader range of
cases, clients may approach their advocates with a wariness
and dissembling that will cloud whatever relationship is established. Perhaps most important, the view that the advocate may struggle with her client for the sake of her own
goals, and that this struggle may "sometimes end in betrayal"I

5

by the advocate, seems to tempt such advocates to

exercise sweeping and manipulative power over their
clients. 116
Nonetheless, Simon's vision of nonprofessional advocacy at least confirms that we cannot readily vindicate clientcentered manipulation as simply part of the inherent nature
of advocacy. Not only can we discern lawyering styles that
would lessen the intensity of such manipulation, but we can
posit an alternative model of lawyering that rejects clientcentered approaches more fundamentally. Simon's alternative may well abandon client-centered manipulation only at
the peril of embarking upon other, perhaps even more manipulative paths. Yet so long as we know there are alternatives, we must look for justifications for the particular quality
and quantity of manipulation entailed in client-centered
practice.
B. Manipulation and Client Choice
1. The Nature of Lawyers' Duties to Their Clients
We cannot decide the proper weight to accord to the
possible justifications of manipulation without a standard of
from client confidences) might help restore trust. Placed under pressure to "act on
their suspicions" of their clients in order to avoid liability for conduct they should
have discovered and disclosed, id., attorneys would have an incentive to engage in
"honest conversations" with the clients, whereas today attorneys and clients avoid
such conversations precisely because they do not trust each other. The result of
requiring "mutually suspicious inquiry" might in the end be, at least for many
attorneys and clients, to reveal to both sides that each can trust the other. Id. at
1031-32. I suspect that the effects of this proposal, for better and for worse,
would resemble the impact of Simon's suggested reconstitution of advocate-client
relations.
115. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 51, at 134.
116. More recently, in describing his conception of "Critical lawyering," Simon
has offered standards for attorneys' conduct that plainly risk extensive manipulation of clients in the name of ideals to which the lawyer, but not necessarily the
client, will be committed. See infra text accompanying notes 153-62.
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measurement. I suggest that the standard should be a conception of the primary responsibilities that lawyers should
meet in our society. It might be argued, for example, that
the lawyer's role, like that of the entrepreneur, is to promote
the general welfare by pursuing economic opportunities. If
so, the lawyer's manipulation of her client to protect her
own economic interest in a case might be altogether appropriate and desirable. 1 7 Or it might be said that lawyers have
a major responsibility for insuring that their own clients' behavior is lawful orjust-in which case the lawyer's defense of
society's interests in her dealings with her client could be the
first priority. 18

I want to offer and briefly suggest the basis for a different conception, one in which the principle of client decisionmaking occupies a much more prominent place. Let me
begin with the proposition that lawyers should seek to foster
the autonomy of their clients within the law. 11 I will not
attempt to offer a full philosophical analysis of the concept
of autonomy, but I do suggest that the three aspects of autonomy that I discuss below represent important elements in
an individual's attaining rational control over his own life,
and, in particular, in making legal choices that may have
profound effects on him and his world.
The first of these aspects of autonomy is the client's
right to make decisions among his legal options, to "seek
any lawful objective through legally available means, and...
present for adjudication any lawful claim, issue, or defense."120 The individual "cannot rightfully be compelled to
do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, be117. Cf Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 669, 677-84 (1986) (arguing that in certain fields of class and derivative
litigation, it is analytically more helpful to see the lawyer not as a fiduciary and
agent of the client, but "more as an entrepreneur who regards a litigation as a
risky asset that requires continuing investment decisions").
118. Cf Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Cost of Legal Controls, 93
YALE L.J. 857, 888-96 (1984) (discussing the imposition of "gatekeeper liability"
on groups such as outside directors, lawyers, accountants, and investment bankers, who are not part of the corporation but are in a position to monitor and/or
control aspects of its behavior).
119. Charles Fried so construed the lawyer's role in his well-known article,
Fried, The Lawyer as Friend. The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85
YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
120. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 7-1.
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cause it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of
others, to do so would be wise, or even right."' 12 1 Hence the
lawyer should afford her client the opportunity to make his
own decisions about the pursuit of his goals within the legal
system and to have them implemented.
The second aspect of autonomy is the individual's actual
capacity to make a decision that is truly his own-the capacity, in other words, to take advantage of the opportunity for
choice. It is not easy to state what this capacity consists of;
as we have already seen, 122 different people may adhere to
fundamentally different ways of decisionmaking as well as to
widely differing decisions. But we will discuss shortly a
range of ways in which we may be able to say that this capacity, however difficult to define, has been palpably impaired. 2 3 A lawyer should seek to remedy such impairments
and thus assist her client in attaining the competence to
decide.
The third aspect of autonomy is the individual's exercise of this capacity for choice. This exercise, of course, typically includes the identification of alternatives and their
consequences. It equally includes the individual's selection
of a course of action based on his values. 24 Binder and
Price do protect this third aspect of autonomy in their suggestions, described above, 25 for careful identification of the
consequences as the client sees them. But what we wantwhat we might identify as positive consequences-is not necessarily what we most value. 126 Because choice is a matter of
121. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (A. Castell ed. 1947).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
123. See infra text accompanying notes 139-162.
124. Dan Brock has suggested, "For convenience, call all actions when our motivating desires are as we want them to be cases of autonomous action; in autonomous action, agents seek their good as they perceive it." Brock, Paternalism and
Promoting the Good, in PATERNALISM 237, 248 (R. Sartorius ed. 1983).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 93-102.
126. David Luban has discussed the distinction between wants and values at
length, and has characterized "wants" as "subjective events." Luban, supra note
27, at 468. "Values," on the other hand, he sees as "those reasons [for acting]
with which the agent most closely identifies-those that form the core of his personality, that make him who he is. This is why we feel that we understand a person's actions when we comprehend them as 'flowing from' his values ....
Id. at
470. Luban's definitions may overstate the centrality of an individual's consciously acknowledged values to his personality, but he nonetheless points, I believe, to a genuine aspect of our moral experience. Many of us, surely, have
wanted to be better persons than we are.
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values, in turn, I understand the full exercise of the capacity
for choice to include the critical reconsideration, if appropri27
ate, of one's own wants and values.
Plainly, not every person will wish to engage in such a
critical reconsideration of his own values, or even to undertake a detailed exploration of options and consequences in
terms of his present values. Indeed, a refusal to engage in
such decisionmaking can itself be an act of autonomy,
though sometimes a very costly one. The lawyer's role, however, is not to compel such decisionmaking but only to facilitate or encourage it. In a related context, Charles Fried has
rejected the argument that "a lawyer must assume that the
client is not a decent, moral person, has no desire to fulfill
his moral obligations, and is asking only what is the minimum that he must do to stay within the law." 128 The lawyer
who seeks to enable her client to act autonomously should
similarly reject the assumption that her clients will refuse the
opportunity. To this end, she should offer her client not
only assistance in the collating of relevant considerations
bearing on a decision but also "the fullness of [her] experience," 1 29 including her sense of the moral factors bearing on
the client's decision.
Let us now consider, in light of this understanding of
lawyers' responsibilities to their clients, whether manipulation can be justified. We may begin by outlining the reasons
that a lawyer might wield such power over her clients.
Broadly, she may do so for any of three purposes: to serve
her own interests, to serve her clients' interests as she understands them, or to serve the interests of third parties or
society. Perhaps surprisingly, each of these reasons may, in
certain contexts, be consistent with the duty to foster the autonomy of the client.
2.

Manipulation in the Lawyer's Self-Interest

If the lawyer's role is to foster her clients' autonomy,
her manipulation of clients for the sake of her own self-interest seems at first blush to be wholly inappropriate. Indeed,
the legal profession's ethical codes strongly disapprove of
127. Luban points out that "[v]alues are in principle intersubjective, and susceptible to argument and disputation." Id. at 468.
128. Fried, supra note 119, at 1088.
129. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 7-8.
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representation of clients by lawyers whose own interests
conflict with their clients' needs. 130 To permit lawyers to
manipulate for ostensibly client-serving reasons may invite
them to serve their own interests instead; to permit manipulation explicitly in the service of lawyers' self-interests is to
throw clients to the wolves.
It deserves to be mentioned, however, that the implicit
definition of "conflict" in the professional codes is a careful
one. Clients desire not to lose money and lawyers desire to
receive fees. These desires are in conflict, yet in most circumstances the bar accepts the legitimacy of conditioning
the rendering of legal services on the rendering of payment
3
in return.' '

Similarly, clients presumably want the best legal service
they can afford, and lawyers want the most rewarding group
of clients they can represent. The bar permits lawyers to
handle any case for which they are competent, and while
lawyers are generally urged to bring all relevant considerations to the client's attention in the course of the representation, they appear to be under no obligation to advise
potential clients of the availability of other, more competent
lawyers who could handle their cases. 132 No doubt there are
other interests, for example in peace of mind or freedom
from interruption, which lawyers may pursue without "conflict" with their clients.
It is quite conceivable that such interests could be
served by manipulative conduct. A lawyer might try to impress a prospective client with a general aura of expertise
despite her actual ignorance of the field of law relevant to
the client's case. Similarly, she might falsely threaten to
withdraw from the case to press the client to pay her fee. Or
she might try to push the client to make quick decisions in
order to avoid spending scarce time in lengthy consultations. The legitimacy of such steps should be in question, in
light of the weight we are placing on fostering clients'
130. See id. DR 5-101; MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.7.
131. For a striking exception, see Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S. Ct. 1531, 1538 &
n.14, 1550 & n.5 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing and, in the dissent,
adopting the view that an attorney in evaluating a settlement offer for his client
must do so without regard to her own interest in obtaining a fee).
132. See MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 6-1; MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule

1.1 and Comment.
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unimpaired decisionmaking. But because lawyers who find
their work economically or intellectually or emotionally
draining may do less or worse work as a result, the protection of clients from manipulation also requires at least some

33
protection of lawyers.1

It is possible, however, to formulate a much broader,
and much less palatable, argument for lawyers' manipulation
in their own self-interest. If clients enjoy autonomy, after
all, so do lawyers. If autonomy entails acting in accordance
with one's values, lawyers' actions should be in accord with
their values, and so lawyers who believe that manipulation is
appropriate should be acknowledged to have a right as autonomous persons to implement that belief.
Such a sweeping notion of lawyers' autonomy, however,
will not withstand scrutiny. The autonomy a civil society
protects, after all, cannot be the right to act wholly in accordance with one's values, but only some more modest
guarantee of protection for the pursuit of those values
within ajust system of laws. It seems hard to claim thatjustice requires that lawyers be free to manipulate their clients
at will. Such a rule would plainly deprive clients of any
shield against the individual predilections of their lawyers,
and so might profoundly disrupt such protection of clients'
autonomy as our legal system affords.' 3 4 Moreover, the
range of attorney interaction with clients that this Article
finds consistent with client autonomy is substantial enough
to allow lawyers considerable opportunity to express, and
sometimes to implement, their personal moral beliefs while
remaining faithful to their clients. To expand radically the
133. Lawyers may also find that they need to manipulate in order to fend off
the pressures, and even the manipulations, of their clients. Cf Sarat & Felstiner,
Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 93, 121-22
(1986) (describing the lawyer's effort to defend himself against the client's emotional transference and testing).
134. But cf. A. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
(1980). Goldman argues for a "principle of moral right," id. at 139, which "would
require a lawyer to aid his clients in achieving all and only that to which they have
moral rights." Id. at 138. Under this principle, each lawyer would presumably
have to judge whether a client's legal rights amounted to moral rights, and would
presumably do so based on her own understanding of "moral right." Though
Goldman maintains that clients will still be able to secure representation unless
their moral claims are clearly unfounded, his proposal would seem at least to
abridge clients' assurance that their legal rights-which I have called an aspect of
their autonomy-would be vindicated.
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opportunities for lawyers' expression of their personal beliefs in their practice would be to liberate lawyers at the expense of their clients.
3.

Manipulation in the Client's Self-Interest

A more familiar rationale for attorneys' manipulation of
their clients is that a lawyer has a duty to protect the client's
best interests even if the client does not perceive them. If
this argument is taken to sanction paternalistic intervention
to override the wishes of a client who is capable of making
his own choices, then it amounts to a breach of the requirement that lawyers must afford their clients an opportunity to
make their own legal decisions. But in other circumstances
paternalistic manipulation may serve rather than disserve
the autonomy of clients.
a.

Client Consent

First, a client might freely and voluntarily decide, as
Binder and Price recognize, to let the lawyer make decisions
for him.' 3 5 Presumably a client could voluntarily decide to
let his lawyer manipulate him too-for example, by asking
the lawyer to reassure him that a decision is a wise one.
Surely it can be paternalistic not to honor such choices. Arguably, moreover, clients regularly, even if implicitly, ask for
36
precisely this service from their lawyers.'
There are, however, serious difficulties with this rationale. Lawyers disposed to make decisions for their clients
may sharply overestimate the frequency of such authoriza135. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 9, at 198.
It could even be argued that citizens en masse have consented to lawyers' manipulation by approving, or failing to disapprove, the professional codes of ethics
under which lawyers operate. If it is fair to say that the public has given any such
consent at all, however, I think it cannot be claimed that the professional codes
provide sufficient notice of lawyers' use of manipulative techniques to justify finding real public authorization of this aspect of legal practice.
136. Cf. C. LIDZ, A. MEISEL, E. ZERUBAVEL, M. CARTER, R. SESTAK, & L. ROTH,
INFORMED CONSENT: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN PSYCHIATRY 25 (1984)
(describing study in which patients were given information about the risks of angiography only if they indicated, in response to offer, that they wanted to receive the
information; only about one-third of the patients wanted to be informed). The
authors emphasize, however, that empirical data concerning the application of the
doctrine of informed consent in medical care-a doctrine somewhat analogous to
the right of client decisionmaking focused on in this Article-is limited. Id. at
24-32.
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tion, particularly if the supposed "authorization" is implicit.
Moreover, to act on such "authorization" assumes that what
clients ask for is freely and knowingly chosen. To the extent
that clients assume that legal services, by definition, include
lawyer decisionmaking, their request for such decisionmaking may not be free. 137 Even if lawyers offer the choice of
decisionmaking allocation to their clients-probably not a
very common occurrence-the clients may have little grasp
of the issues at stake.' 38
b. Clients' Lack of Relevant Information
Clients may frequently, even typically, lack essential
knowledge required for decisionmaking. Binder and Price,
who make clear their dislike of uninformed advice from lawyers concerning the clients' interests, nevertheless agree that
lawyers' legal expertise means that they must bear "the responsibility for identifying the probable legal consequences
of any particular alternative."' 139 Current ethical standards
and constitutional decisions in the field of criminal procedure assert similar grounds for vesting in lawyers startling
amounts of authority not only to advise but to decide on crucial questions of litigation strategy. 140
Lawyers' expertise and clients' ignorance might be said
to justify lawyers' exercise of authority in making decisions
or their manipulation of their clients' decisions about legal
questions. But this argument is not overpowering, for it
would be possible to fashion a system which responded to
clients' ignorance much more with education or simplification' 4' than with control. To empower clients rather than
their lawyers, however, would have costs-in systemic efficiency, perhaps in lawyers' pleasure in their work and its rewards (and thus perhaps ultimately in the quality of legal
137. See Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A
Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 49 (1986) (discussing the difficulties faced even
by fee-paying criminal clients in finding a lawyer willing to share decisionmaking
power over issues normally reserved to lawyers).
138. See id. at 50; Spiegel, supra note 8, at, 82 n.160, 83 (arguing that clients are
unable to make educated general decisions about allocation of decisionmaking
authority at the beginning of the attorney-client relationship).
139. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 9, at 143.
140. See Berger, supra note 137, at 10-59.
141. As noted earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 87-88, lawyers' "simplification" of these issues so as to help their clients make decisions need not be
manipulative.
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services), and surely in the time and cost of legal services for
people who would now face arduous educational endeavors
in the process of solving the far from academic problems
which brought them to a lawyer's office.' 42
Some of these costs are essentially trade-offs between
the interests of clients in making their own decisions and the
interests of society in minimizing the resources eaten up in
conflict resolution. But to the extent that lawyers decide (or
are required) to provide education rather than direction and
thus perhaps to drive up the costs and scarcity of legal assistance, the very value of autonomy that education protects
may be jeopardized. Since the principle of client decisionmaking is meaningless unless decisions once made can be
carried out, a system which prices some people out of the
market for the assistance they need to press their claims has
performed only a dubious service for clients. 143
When neither education nor simplification could give
the client the ability to approach a fully competent decision,
therefore, manipulation of the client's decision seems justifiable. 144 Such manipulation should, however, remain as
142. Many of these costs are identified by Vivian Berger and Mark Spiegel. See
Berger, supra note 137, at 10-59; Spiegel, supra note 8, at 113-23.
143. Spiegel has urged that client decisionmaking in legal situations be protected by requiring lawyers to obtain the clients' "informed consent" to a wide
range of decisions, many of them dealing with procedural rather than solely substantive choices. Spiegel, supra note 8, at 123-26. He argues that the cost of this
proposal will be reduced by the likelihood that clients will not choose to make
every decision when they are offered the opportunity. If this prediction is correct,
it means that the costs of informed consent will be tempered by clients' willingness not to be informed.
It seems likely, however, that clients who forego the opportunity to give informed consent will often do so on the basis of sparse information. In other
words, their decision not io give informed consent may be an uninformed one. It
also seems likely that lawyers seeking their clients' authorization to make decisions without informed consent may fall into manipulation in the process. The
advice Spiegel himself suggests that a lawyer might give in presenting this issue to
a client seems both factually accurate and potentially subtly tilted against client
decisionmaking:
Lawyer: We now have to decide what court to file in. Choosing state
court would mean a long delay but might mean a better chance of
winning. If you leave the decision to me, I will go to state court, but
if the delay is important to you, we can discuss it. This is your decision, if you wish, but if we do discuss it, it may take a half hour or so,
which, as you know, costs $25 of my time. What do you want to do?
Id. at 112 n.295.
144. As Henry Monaghan has pointed out to me, there is no room for education in night court.
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faithful as possible to the principle of client choice. The lawyer may be able to evaluate, or at least surmise, what choice
the client would have made if he had been fully competent; if
so, she should seek to manipulate the client towards this
choice. When this hypothetical choice cannot be discerned,
however, it would seem that the lawyer would be justified in
manipulating her client into protecting his interests as the
lawyer perceives them-for she has no other competently selected course by which to steer.
We should not leave the subject of clients' lack of information without noting one other obvious remedy for it: the
lawyer's advice and recommendations. Binder and Price
emphasize the risk that even the shadow of the lawyer's advice may sway the client's decision, 45 and this risk surely is a
large one. Yet to call this prospect a "risk" will sometimes
be a mistake, for the lawyer's advice may affect the client not
by overpowering but by informing him.
Lawyers do have valuable expertise, and an experienced
practitioner is likely to have valuable insight into the practical and human considerations of a case as well as into its
legal problems. A fully vigilant decisionmaker, one who
seeks to understand as well as possible the costs and benefits of the options open to him, may welcome the lawyer's
advice. Such a client would not be overwhelmed by the advice when he received it; indeed, Binder and Price themselves speak of clients who will, despite hearing advice,
46
retain their decisionmaking capacity.1
For such a client the lawyer's advice would be information, perhaps very important and influential information, but
not direction. It seems fair to say that a lawyer who avoids
giving advice to a client capable of assessing it is acting with
disrespect towards her client by failing to treat him as a competent person. 147 A lawyer who fails to give advice to a client capable of assessing it, moreover, could actually be
impairing her client's decisionmaking by withholding data
that he might find helpful. In these circumstances, it is not
145.
146.
147.
duty to
person

See supra text accompanying notes 75-84.
D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 9, at 186.
Cf Fried, supra note 119, at 1088 (discussing the lawyer's breach of her
treat her client with respect when she assumes that the client is not a moral
who will be concerned to understand and fulfill his moral duties).
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the provision of advice but the failure to provide it that may
be manipulation.
c. Clients' Emotional Disabilities
A lawyer may also decide to manipulate (or override)
her client's expression of his wishes because the client is
emotionally unable to make his own decisions, or at least unable to make them well. Probably most people go to lawyers
rarely, and overcome their hesitancy or distaste only when
they have relatively pressing and unfamiliar problems to resolve. Many clients arrive in lawyers' offices in emergencies.
Situations alien and intractable to such clients may be familiar and even routine to their lawyers. The advantage lawyers
then have in decisionmaking is not only a product of their
"knowing the ropes," but of their relative detachment and
assurance at a time when clients may be frantic, impulsive or
paralyzed.
Again, the emotional weaknesses in clients' decisionmaking capacities do not necessarily justify lawyers' making
or manipulating decisions. Binder and Price mention at
least two alternatives: referring the client to a mental health
professional and recommending that the client wait before
making a decision.148 In many cases, however, clients who
are not suffering from serious mental illness will be facing
issues that demand resolution without delay, and will find
themselves handicapped by the stress their situations impose
on them. Even those clients who could benefit from treatment may not be able to get it-an example of the impact of
broader social decisions and priorities on the degree of decisionmaking freedom that the lawyer-client relationship can
provide.
Surely much that is manipulative in Binder and Price's
recommendations is meant to help this array of troubled clients. Non-judgmental empathetic understanding can make
such clients feel accepted, cared for, and reasonable. The
carefully structured decisionmaking process can give the client a method for coping with his complex, even contradictory concerns. Surely, too, manipulation of this sort, aimed
at restoring or at least improving the client's decisionmaking
capacities, is particularly readily justified, for this conduct di148. D.

BINDER & S. PRICE, supra

note 9, at 207-08, 211-23.
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rectly addresses the lawyer's responsibility for helping clients attain the capacity to make decisions that are truly their
own.
Even so, the lawyer's decision to attempt to resolve decisionmaking problems her client is experiencing is not one
to be made lightly. It is easy for a lawyer to discern decisionmaking problems in a client whose decisions the lawyer considers mistaken, yet mistakes are part of the prerogative of
competent decisionmakers.149 Similarly, the lawyer may be
prone to confuse her client's competent preference for visceral, impulsive choice with a decisionmaking deficiency that
impairs his ability to make a vigilant decision.
It must also be emphasized that the practice of active
listening echoes a similar approach characteristic of psychotherapy. 150 That resemblance should be troublesome. Patients in psychotherapy may experience major personal
shifts as a result of treatment-a measure of the potency of
the techniques in play. Yet patients in therapy may well have
sought out and in some sense consented to the therapist's
effort to change them, while it seems less likely that lawyers'
clients expect therapy in their lawyers' offices. In addition,
therapists are likely to make better, more discriminating use
of such techniques than psychologically untrained lawyers
are able to.
We should not understate the degree of manipulation
potentially entailed in using techniques borrowed from therapeutic settings to assist clients facing legal decisions. Nor
should we overlook the potential breach of client autonomy
that can follow from a judgment that a client's decisionmaking strategy is defective.
149. See, e.g., Ramsey, Representation of the Child in ProtectionProceedings: The Determination of Decision-Making Capacity, 17 FAM. L.Q. 287, 306-07 (1983) (criticizing a
standard of assessing the competence of a child that turns on the "rightness" of
the child's decision).
150. See I. JANIS & L. MANN, supra note 22, at 370 (describing attitudes very
similar to those of non-judgmental empathetic regard as among "standard fea-

tures of the clinical stance adopted by many well-trained psychotherapists"); W.
Pachter, An Investigation of Variables Related to Client Evaluation of the LawyerClient Relationship in Divorce Cases 80-81 (1984) (unpublished dissertation)
(citing evidence of the importance of "nonspecific factors, such as communication
of understanding, respect, interest, encouragement and acceptance by the therapist" to therapeutic success).
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Once such a judgment has been made, a professional
seeking to assist the client in making decisions more effectively may act in strikingly manipulative ways. For example,
such a "decision counselor" may respond to clients who do
not recognize the urgency of their situation, or the dangers
of the course of action they wish to adopt, with "dosage[s] of
fear-arousing communications." For a client who is pessimistic and demoralized, the counselors may select "appropriate reassurances" and "convey a sense of optimism."
Such techniques, all potentially within a lawyer's arsenal, offer the lawyer an avenue into the client's soul, and surely for
that reason should be used only sparingly.' 5 '
Even after the client's problems have been alleviated,
the effects of these psychological tools may persist. A client
who has come to look to his attorney for warmth, reassurance and support may be ill-equipped indeed to treat her
views on his situation merely as data for him to accept or
reject as he sees fit. Out of fear of alienating his attorney, or
out of the deep trust he may have developed for her, such a
client may have become less able to resist influence by the
attorney at the same time that he became more able to deal
in other respects with his situation. As a result, a lawyer who
has offered the client such emotional sustenance may be unable to give otherwise acceptable advice without overbearing
her client. We will return to this tension between emotional
support and pragmatic counsel below.15 2
d.

Clients' Ignorance of Their Own Interests

So far we have discussed manipulation by lawyers to
remedy their clients' lack of special expert knowledge or
their suffering from special emotional stress. The argument
for intervention to remedy client deficiencies, however, can
be pressed much further, by pointing to the possible inequality between lawyer and client in their political or moral
understanding of the world. This inequality may be no more
151. These techniques are described in I. JANIS & L. MANN, supra note 22, at
374-75. Janis and Mann offer them as tools for "decision counselors," or for any
other professionals, including lawyers, who are qualified to function in such a
role. Id. at 369. The use of such techniques, moreover, need not be terribly timeconsuming;Janis and Mann suggest that they can be used in as little as one or two
hours of counseling. Id.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 167-69.
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than a difference-but probably few people altogether accept that a difference in political or moral views is not also a
difference between wise and unwise, or between right and
wrong. Does such a difference in judgments justify the lawyer's exercise of power over her client?
William Simon has addressed this issue as well. In an
article written some years after his proposal of nonprofessional advocacy, he develops a description of "Critical lawyering." Critical lawyering is a form of practice that is not
based on the representation of clients' "preexisting subjective ends,"' 153 but instead "is willing to consider that people
might have interests of which they are not aware."'

54

Criti-

cal lawyering, accordingly, appeals not to "ostensibly preexisting subjective interests" but to "the ideal of
155
nonhierarchical community."'
Simon readily acknowledges that the meaning of this
ideal is far from clearcut. The Critical lawyer, however,
seeks simultaneously to intuit its contours and on that basis
shape her lawyering, and "to enhance the client's capacity to
express her own interests."' 56 Ultimately, it appears, the
lawyer may remain faithful to the client's interests; even a
Critical lawyer perhaps could not "represent" a client with a
57
view to causing deliberate harm to her client's interest.
The test of the accuracy of the lawyer's judgment of the client's interests, however, is not what the client may have to
say in the here-and-now, but:
that the client come to share that judgment under conditions which lawyer and client agree are nonhierarchical.
The expectation that the client will do so is as much a
hope as a prediction, and it can be fully vindicated only
where the client has had an opportunity to disappoint
and refute it. 158
Obviously this is a test that may never have to be
passed. Even if client and lawyer arrive at this nonhierarchical state, the interactions that have brought them to that
point surely are likely to affect the client's judgment about
153. Simon, Visions of Practicein Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469, 485 (1984).

154. Id. at 488.
155. Id. at 485.
156. Id. at 486.
157. See id. at 489 n.47.

158. Id. at 488.
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the course of their association, and so to diminish further
the force of this criterion.
Yet in order to catalyze the clients' understanding of
their true interests (as opposed to those they only believe
they have), or to engage the clients in the pursuit of their
interests, the Critical lawyer may be entitled to engage in
dramatic manipulation of her clients. Simon himself illustrates this dismaying prospect in his description of a deposition taken in a farmworker housing case. The deposition
was taken at the housing camp, and thus permitted the tenants to see their housing manager subjected to the rigors of
legal inquisition. The result was to energize the clients
politically.
As Simon sees it, this deposition "does not appear to
have been instrumental to any initially articulated goal. It
does not appear to have produced valuable information or
to have had any strategic impact on the adversary. Its importance lies in the way it affected the clients."' 1 9 It seems
reasonable to infer that a lawyer seeking such effects would
not announce them to the clients in advance, at least with
any great detail, for such an announcement would both
lessen the dramatic impact of the scene and risk tainting it
with annoyance, on the clients' part, at being subjected- to
such condescension. But the decision to create such an experience for the clients, an experience not without risk, 160
without informing them of what they are about to be exposed to or the true reasons for exposing them, is surely an
act of manipulation.
Simon's model of Critical lawyering is troublesome in
part because it authorizes such stark manipulation of clients,
and so undercuts the client's opportunity to make his own
choices-the first form of autonomy on which we have focused. The preceding pages have argued, however, that manipulation may be justifiable, despite its interference with
some aspects of clients' freedom to choose if its purpose is
to remedy deficiencies in their ability to choose that prevent
them from fully exercising that freedom.
159. Id. at 483. The account of the deposition quoted does not make clear
what advice, if any, the lawyer gave the clients about it. Id.
160. This deposition could, for example, have infuriated the camp manager
and led to reprisals against those tenants unlucky enough to have witnessed his
humiliation.
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The Critical model might also be defended as endorsing
manipulation as a remedy for client incapacity-here, a
political incapacity.1 61 But this explanation is itself troubling, because Critical thought affirms so broad a notion of
client incapacity, or, to use a more traditional and political
term, "false consciousness." If we push the range of incapacities justifying intervention so far, we begin to dispose of
the original premise that adults, our peers in the world we
live in, can and should make the decisions that govern their
own lives. In certain circumstances political leaders make
such judgments,1 62 but I suggest that lawyers should normally hew more closely to the principle that their clients are
able to choose for themselves.
4.

Manipulation in the Interest of Third Parties

Manipulation of clients might be justified, finally, on a
third ground: that such conduct is required to protect the
interests of third parties or society. The basic legitimacy of
some exercise of power by lawyers for the sake of third parties is currently beyond question. After all, lawyers are required to refrain from suborning perjury, even when their
clients might help themselves by committing this crime. The
reason is that lawyers, even in the lawyer-client relationship,
are under some duties, and impose some duties on their clients, derived from obligations to the larger society.
Such intervention raises no problem of paternalism, because it does not claim to benefit the client against his will,
161. Robert Amdur has emphasized to me the special intrusiveness of such a
view of political incapacity. I should note that Critical lawyering may not itself
assert the incapacity of clients as the basis for its prescriptions. It may be that
Critical lawyers would justify their conduct as an expression of their own values,
or as a vindication of the interests of third parties, rather than as a variant on
paternalistic responses to incapacity.
162. Thus Michael Walzer has sought to elucidate the moral constraints on
activists,
given the claim they commonly make: to speak or act on behalf of
oppressed men and women. It is important to try to do this, since
the activists are rarely authorized to speak or act on behalf of anyone
(I do not mean that they have no right to do so), nor is it easy for the
mass of the oppressed to repudiate them because of what they say or
do.
M. WALZER, OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, AND CITIZENSHIP 52-53
(1970). He concludes, in part, that "activists must pay attention to and be guided
by the consciousness of the oppressed (even if they hope to change that consciousness)." Id. at 59.
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but rather asserts that it benefits third parties. By the same
token, however, such intervention seems very hard to square
with the premise that a lawyer's function is centrally to aid
her own clients in expressing and implementing their
wishes.
Even if such a sacrifice of clients to third parties were
more tenable as a matter of theory, lawyers' intervention
with their clients might well fail to serve effectively the interests of third parties. It is surely open to question whether
the interventions that such a system would encourage would
implement any unified social policy, or would instead merely
impose the varying views of individual lawyers-whose views
may be quite different from the positions of the public as a
whole-on more or less unsuspecting clients. It is also open
to question whether lawyers, sharply constrained as they are
by their needs for clients and popularity, would apply any
principles of intervention with great vigor. And it is, finally,
open to question whether clients, if they learned that such
interventions were the price of dealing with lawyers, would
approach their lawyers with much openness or trust.
Although we already rely on lawyers, perhaps simply for
lack of a better alternative, to intervene for such purposes as
the prevention of perjury, I suspect that the questions just
set out make broader general use of lawyers to control their
clients' decisions for the sake of social good unpromising. 16 3
But that judgment does not support the conclusion that
Binder and Price appear to have accepted-that the lawyer
should never seek to engage the client in discussion of the
political or moral quality of his actions.
On the contrary, a fully autonomous decisionmaker is a
person prepared to consider, if appropriate, the correctness
of the values he is bringing to bear on his decision. 16 4 Moreover, such a decisionmaker has the capacity to assess the
lawyer's views on political or moral questions, just as he can
assess the lawyer's advice on more purely legal issues. 165
163. There may well be exceptions to this generalization. For suggestions of
settings in which lawyers might be able to play an enforcement role, see Kraakman, supra note 118, at 888-96.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 119-29.
165. It might be argued that the lawyer who expresses only his own moral
views, rather than the full range of possible moral stances on the issue in question,
is manipulating the client by presenting him with incomplete information. This
argument has some force, and I do think that it behooves lawyers who are giving
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Perhaps, in fact, a layman can better assess a lawyer's views
on morality, an area in which lawyers probably do not enjoy
a reputation for special expertise, than he can judge the lawyer's evaluation of issues of law.
To refrain from raising such arguments on the grounds
that expressing them might unduly influence the client is
thus to deny the client's competence, and perhaps to diminish this competence by diverting the client's attention from
factors he would otherwise consider.' 66 Since political or
moral arguments may speak to the interests of the decisionmaker himself, the failure to raise such considerations
advice to acknowledge the existence of other views or even to suggest that the
client talk further about the matter with other people whom he trusts.
Once a lawyer has made clear that she is stating only her own view, however, I
would not characterize her expression of only that view as manipulation. In part
this judgment is a parsing of the concept of manipulation; the lawyer's expression
of her own views, presented simply as her own views, provides the client with no
more and no less information than the lawyer has promised.
To be sure, it could still be said that the lawyer has withheld other information-other moral views of which she, but perhaps not her client, is aware. But an
attempt to express all of the possible views could rob the lawyer's statements of
clarity and weaken the force of her own views, and so might prevent the lawyer
from engaging the client in a serious moral dialogue. For some clients, at least,
only a lawyer who can present her views fully will be able to help her client in a
meaningful reconsideration of his position. Thus the lawyer's presentation of her
views is akin to the simplification which Binder and Price emphasize is necessary
for the lawyer's effective explanation of the consequences of the options available
to her client.
To require the lawyer to present opposing views on issues of morality or politics may also amount to a special intrusion on the lawyer's own autonomy, since it
would require her to express values of which she herself disapproves. On the
offer of moral counsel as an expression of the lawyer's autonomy, see infra note
167.
166. To say that lawyers should be able to raise political and moral concerns
with their clients does not, however, altogether resolve the question of which views
the lawyer should raise. There may be circumstances in which a lawyer's frank
expression of her values will-far from overwhelming her client-instead profoundly alienate him. Thus, for instance, a lawyer might indeed hesitate before
urging the virtue of confession on a criminal defendant.
As Robert Dinerstein has pointed out to me, there may also be situations in
which the lawyer should at least put before her client values she does not share. A
defendant in a politically charged case, for example, may need to be reminded of
the selfish reasons for accepting a plea bargain. I am inclined to view these instances as results of the obligation of lawyers to ensure that their clients understand the advantages and disadvantages of the options they are weighing, and, as
such, as justified limitation on lawyers' autonomy.

776

UCLA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 34:717

may also blunt the decisionmaker's perception even of his
own self-interest. 167
Nonetheless, it is surely true that some clients whose
lawyers seek to press political views upon them will yield to
these arguments for such manipulative reasons as their assumption of the need to defer to their lawyers. The way out
of this conundrum is not, however, to silence lawyers' political and moral speech. Instead, we should seek to recognize
both the propriety of lawyers' nonmanipulative efforts to persuade their clients to reassess the moral or political rectitude
of their acts, and the importance of preserving clients' decisionmaking authority. More generally, we should seek the
contours of a practice that will support each of the three elements of clients' autonomy identified earlier in this Article:
the client's enjoyment of the opportunity to choose, his attainment of the capacity to choose, and his full exercise of
that capacity.
5.

Practice in the Support of Clients' Autonomy

To discern the course of a practice in support of clients'
autonomy, we must confront the uncomfortable reality that
efforts to aid one aspect of a client's autonomy may undercut
the client in another respect. Elaborate education or subtle
emotional approaches meant to remedy clients' decisionmaking deficiencies may tax the lawyer's skills and both parties' time and money. As a result, these well-intentioned
steps may diminish clients' access to the help they need if
they are even to recognize the opportunities for decisionmaking that confront them. The careful use of active listening to help the client develop some assurance that he is
capable of making decisions may also engender such trust
and affection for the lawyer that advice from the lawyer
which the client would previously have dismissed out of
167. As Fried also points out, the lawyer herself is (or aspires to be) an autonomous person. He suggests that a lawyer who gives advice to her client on moral
issues "experiences the very special satisfaction of assisting the client not only to
realize his autonomy within the law, but also to realize his status as a moral being." Fried emphasizes that the lawyer is "in no way disentitle[d] ... from experiencing this satisfaction." Fried, supra note 119, at 1088. I would add that the
legitimacy of such counseling tends to diminish the force of an argument that
lawyers should be entitled, for the sake of their own moral integrity, to manipulate
their clients with greater freedom. See supra text accompanying notes 133-34.
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hand, or evaluated with detachment, comes to enjoy the status of Holy Writ.
Perhaps no set of steps that an attorney can take will
provide absolute assurance against manipulation. 168 But we
have not sought in this exploration of lawyers' interaction
with their clients to erase the shadow of manipulative motives or effects altogether, and it is possible to suggest the
elements of a practice that would seek to support clients' autonomy more fully than the model suggested by Binder and
Price, or the opposing visions offered by William Simon.
The guiding goal of such a practice is that a lawyer
should strive to enable her client not only to know what
choices await him, but also to reach full decisionmaking capacity, and then she should participate in her client's exercise of that capacity by offering information, legal advice,
and those other perspectives, be they moral or political, that
constitute the "fullness of [her] experience." Unfortunately
this goal, however ideal, may often be unattainable precisely
because it may be impossible to assist a client's autonomy in
one respect without damaging it in another.
That reality requires the lawyer to make judgments,
early in the case and perhaps repeatedly thereafter, about
her client's needs. Clients come to lawyers with legal
problems, and it is reasonable to say that the lawyer's first
duty should be to insure that her client has the capacity to
confront the principal legal choices awaiting him. To this
end, the lawyer may conclude that she must offer the client
such intense, even therapeutic support that she will ultimately win his deep trust and affection. If so, she may then
be constrained to follow the suggestions Binder and Price
offer for the scrupulous avoidance of advice-advice which
her trusting client no longer could resist.
If, on the other hand, the lawyer discerns that her client's decisionmaking capacities are more substantial, she
may find that she can help him to acquire the information he
needs, and to organize it for evaluation, without eliciting
such strong emotional bonds. She may, for example, be able
168. Simon believes that the Critical lawyer must "remain open to persuasion
by the clients; she as well as the client is vulnerable to change in the process of
representation." Simon, supra note 153, at 488-89. This is surely an appropriate
admonition, but Simon does not suggest that such openness will resolve the problem of lawyers' power over their clients.
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to state from the start that she does not approve of her client's past conduct, but that she is prepared nonetheless to
work zealously to resolve the problems he now faces. Having treated her client with more distance, she will then be in
a position to address him with more frankness. Such a posture will allow her to offer her views on his alternatives, and
even on his moral and political concerns, without undue fear
of overwhelming him.
It will surely not be easy for lawyers to distinguish these
two groups of clients, particularly since any given client may
move from group to group in the course of a case. But, with
some hesitation, I suggest that the underlying concern for
clients' autonomy also offers us a guide to the resolution of
close questions about clients' competency-namely, that the
lawyer should favor the conclusion that her client is fully
competent. This disposition will help protect the client (and
the lawyer) from the risk, reflected in the model of Critical
lawyering, that the lawyer will adopt so sweeping a concept
of clients' diminished capacity that many or even most adult
citizens will be considered unable to enjoy full autonomy.
Finally, candor requires the recognition that the development of a relationship that is both reasonably trusting and
reasonably free of lawyers' domination may take considerable time169-time that may be unavailable. The results of
these time constraints can be painful. A lawyer may, for example, believe she must manipulate the client intensely in
order to protect his interests, because there is no time to
help him develop a capacity to assess his interests well himself. In another case she may conclude that she must refrain
from offering her client counsel that she otherwise would
provide, because in the circumstances this advice would be
manipulative. While her goal should still be to protect the
client's autonomy as fully as possible, she may well be unable to protect more than the client's most immediate and
obvious interests in the situation.
169. Donald Gifford has emphasized the development of the lawyer-client rela-

tionship over time. D. Gifford, The Synthesis of Legal Counseling and Negotia-

tion Models: Preserving Client-Centered Advocacy in the Negotiation Context
(1986) (paper presented at the UCLA-Warwick International Clinical
Conference).
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CONCLUSION

We have arrived at an uncomfortable destination. Having set out to protect clients' right to make decisions while
not altogether abandoning the goal of protecting their best
interests as well, we have found that it is ultimately impossible to assist clients' decisionmaking without at the same time
jeopardizing it, and that the effort to enable clients to make
their own decisions may well entail manipulating them as
well. These conclusions do not leave us with an easy or clear
path to a truly client-centered practice. In finding that the
protection of the autonomy of clients is an ambiguous and
complex task, however, we have only encountered in the interaction between attorneys and clients a difficulty we must
recognize throughout our struggle to be free.

